Chapter 10: Common ownership and merger control enforcement
Common ownership fundamentally upsets the well-settled merger enforcement ecosystem. Not only it challenges basic principles informing merger policy such as the presumed profitability of mergers for the merging firms and the merger-specificity of potential efficiencies but also it works against impl...
Guardado en:
| Autores principales: | , |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Online |
| Lenguaje: | inglés |
| Publicado: |
Edward Elgar Publishing
2023
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/101255 |
| Etiquetas: |
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
|
| _version_ | 1869526544322396160 |
|---|---|
| author | Azar, José Tzanaki, Anna |
| author_browse | Azar, José Tzanaki, Anna |
| author_facet | Azar, José Tzanaki, Anna |
| author_sort | Azar, José |
| collection | Directory of Open Access Books |
| description | Common ownership fundamentally upsets the well-settled merger enforcement ecosystem. Not only it challenges basic principles informing merger policy such as the presumed profitability of mergers for the merging firms and the merger-specificity of potential efficiencies but also it works against implementing tools and presumptions in merger practice such as concentration indices for screening out unproblematic from potentially harmful mergers. The incremental effect of a merger taking place in an environment of common ownership may be either smaller or larger by comparison to a counterfactual with no common ownership. The sign and size of the merger effect will depend on the relative post-merger stakes of the common shareholders in the merging firms vis-à-vis any stakes in non-merging rivals in the same industry and on the specific financial structure of the merger deal. Accordingly, merger enforcement should shift towards more fact-specific analysis and antitrust authorities may want to consider developing guidelines. |
| format | Online |
| id | doab-20.500.12854ir-101255 |
| institution | Directory of Open Access Books |
| language | eng |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| publishDateRange | 2023 |
| publishDateSort | 2023 |
| publisher | Edward Elgar Publishing |
| publisherStr | Edward Elgar Publishing |
| record_format | ojs |
| spelling | doab-20.500.12854ir-1012552023-07-11T14:14:54Z Chapter 10: Common ownership and merger control enforcement Azar, José Tzanaki, Anna Common ownership, horizontal shareholding, merger control, antitrust, competition, institutional investors LNC Common ownership fundamentally upsets the well-settled merger enforcement ecosystem. Not only it challenges basic principles informing merger policy such as the presumed profitability of mergers for the merging firms and the merger-specificity of potential efficiencies but also it works against implementing tools and presumptions in merger practice such as concentration indices for screening out unproblematic from potentially harmful mergers. The incremental effect of a merger taking place in an environment of common ownership may be either smaller or larger by comparison to a counterfactual with no common ownership. The sign and size of the merger effect will depend on the relative post-merger stakes of the common shareholders in the merging firms vis-à-vis any stakes in non-merging rivals in the same industry and on the specific financial structure of the merger deal. Accordingly, merger enforcement should shift towards more fact-specific analysis and antitrust authorities may want to consider developing guidelines. Published 2023-07-11T14:14:52Z 2023-07-11T14:14:52Z 2022-08-16 chapter https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/101255 eng image/jpeg Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International https://www.elgaronline.com/edcollchap-oa/book/9781789903799/book-part-9781789903799-20.xml Edward Elgar Publishing Edward Elgar Publishing https://doi.org/10.4337/9781789903799.00020 https://doi.org/10.4337/9781789903799.00020 01ceac28-75b4-492a-8eec-f9b98bc6b28c https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Edward Elgar Publishing Cheltenham, UK open access |
| spellingShingle | Common ownership, horizontal shareholding, merger control, antitrust, competition, institutional investors LNC Azar, José Tzanaki, Anna Chapter 10: Common ownership and merger control enforcement |
| title | Chapter 10: Common ownership and merger control enforcement |
| title_full | Chapter 10: Common ownership and merger control enforcement |
| title_fullStr | Chapter 10: Common ownership and merger control enforcement |
| title_full_unstemmed | Chapter 10: Common ownership and merger control enforcement |
| title_short | Chapter 10: Common ownership and merger control enforcement |
| title_sort | chapter 10 common ownership and merger control enforcement |
| topic | Common ownership, horizontal shareholding, merger control, antitrust, competition, institutional investors LNC |
| topic_facet | Common ownership, horizontal shareholding, merger control, antitrust, competition, institutional investors LNC |
| url | https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/101255 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT azarjose chapter10commonownershipandmergercontrolenforcement AT tzanakianna chapter10commonownershipandmergercontrolenforcement |