The Conflict Over Kosovo
This report examines the reasons Slobodan Milosevic, the then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, decided on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO's conditions for terminating the conflict over Kosovo. Drawing in part upon the testimony of Milosevic and other senior Serb and foreign officials wh...
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| Format: | Online |
| Jezik: | engleski |
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RAND Corporation
2023
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| Online pristup: | ONIX_20231005_9780833032386_270 |
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| _version_ | 1869522330579894272 |
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| author | Hosmer, Stephen T. |
| author_browse | Hosmer, Stephen T. |
| author_facet | Hosmer, Stephen T. |
| author_sort | Hosmer, Stephen T. |
| collection | Directory of Open Access Books |
| description | This report examines the reasons Slobodan Milosevic, the then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, decided on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO's conditions for terminating the conflict over Kosovo. Drawing in part upon the testimony of Milosevic and other senior Serb and foreign officials who directly interacted with Milosevic, the report analyzes (1) the assumptions and other calculations that underlay Milosevic's initial decision to defy NATO's demands with regard to Kosovo, and (2) the political, economic, and military developments and pressures, and the resulting expectations and concerns that most importantly influenced his subsequent decision to come to terms. While several interrelated factors, including Moscow's eventual endorsement of NATO's terms, helped shape Milosevic's decision to yield, it was the cumulative effect of NATO air power that proved most decisive. The allied bombing of Serbia's infrastructure targets, as it intensified, stimulated a growing interest among both the Servian public and Belgrade officials to end the conflict. Milosevic's belief that the bombing that would follow a rejection of NATO's June 2 peace terms would be massively destructive and threatening to his continued rule made a settlement seem imperative. Also examined are some implications for future U.S. and allied military capabilities and operations. |
| format | Online |
| id | doab-20.500.12854ir-114496 |
| institution | Directory of Open Access Books |
| language | eng |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| publishDateRange | 2023 |
| publishDateSort | 2023 |
| publisher | RAND Corporation |
| publisherStr | RAND Corporation |
| record_format | ojs |
| spelling | doab-20.500.12854ir-1144962024-03-29T19:30:35Z The Conflict Over Kosovo Hosmer, Stephen T. History Political Science thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JP Politics and government::JPS International relations thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JW Warfare and defence This report examines the reasons Slobodan Milosevic, the then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, decided on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO's conditions for terminating the conflict over Kosovo. Drawing in part upon the testimony of Milosevic and other senior Serb and foreign officials who directly interacted with Milosevic, the report analyzes (1) the assumptions and other calculations that underlay Milosevic's initial decision to defy NATO's demands with regard to Kosovo, and (2) the political, economic, and military developments and pressures, and the resulting expectations and concerns that most importantly influenced his subsequent decision to come to terms. While several interrelated factors, including Moscow's eventual endorsement of NATO's terms, helped shape Milosevic's decision to yield, it was the cumulative effect of NATO air power that proved most decisive. The allied bombing of Serbia's infrastructure targets, as it intensified, stimulated a growing interest among both the Servian public and Belgrade officials to end the conflict. Milosevic's belief that the bombing that would follow a rejection of NATO's June 2 peace terms would be massively destructive and threatening to his continued rule made a settlement seem imperative. Also examined are some implications for future U.S. and allied military capabilities and operations. 2023-10-05T10:07:38Z 2023-10-05T10:07:38Z 2001 book ONIX_20231005_9780833032386_270 9780833032386 9780833030030 https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/114496 eng image/jpeg n/a https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/MR1351AF RAND Corporation 10.7249/MR1351AF 10.7249/MR1351AF 47ac0b54-b121-491c-a9c8-5ca6776e27cb 9780833032386 9780833030030 open access |
| spellingShingle | History Political Science thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JP Politics and government::JPS International relations thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JW Warfare and defence Hosmer, Stephen T. The Conflict Over Kosovo |
| title | The Conflict Over Kosovo |
| title_full | The Conflict Over Kosovo |
| title_fullStr | The Conflict Over Kosovo |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Conflict Over Kosovo |
| title_short | The Conflict Over Kosovo |
| title_sort | conflict over kosovo |
| topic | History Political Science thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JP Politics and government::JPS International relations thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JW Warfare and defence |
| topic_facet | History Political Science thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JP Politics and government::JPS International relations thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JW Warfare and defence |
| url | ONIX_20231005_9780833032386_270 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT hosmerstephent theconflictoverkosovo AT hosmerstephent conflictoverkosovo |