How Terrorist Groups End
All terrorist groups eventually end. But how do they end? The evidence since 1968 indicates that most groups have ended because (1) they joined the political process (43 percent) or (2) local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members (40 percent). Military force has rarely been...
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| Materialtyp: | Online |
| Språk: | engelska |
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RAND Corporation
2023
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| Länkar: | ONIX_20231005_9780833046406_548 |
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| _version_ | 1869520655129509888 |
|---|---|
| author | Jones, Seth G. Libicki, Martin C. |
| author_browse | Jones, Seth G. Libicki, Martin C. |
| author_facet | Jones, Seth G. Libicki, Martin C. |
| author_sort | Jones, Seth G. |
| collection | Directory of Open Access Books |
| description | All terrorist groups eventually end. But how do they end? The evidence since 1968 indicates that most groups have ended because (1) they joined the political process (43 percent) or (2) local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members (40 percent). Military force has rarely been the primary reason for the end of terrorist groups, and few groups within this time frame have achieved victory. This has significant implications for dealing with al Qa?ida and suggests fundamentally rethinking post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism strategy: Policymakers need to understand where to prioritize their efforts with limited resources and attention. The authors report that religious terrorist groups take longer to eliminate than other groups and rarely achieve their objectives. The largest groups achieve their goals more often and last longer than the smallest ones do. Finally, groups from upper-income countries are more likely to be left-wing or nationalist and less likely to have religion as their motivation. The authors conclude that policing and intelligence, rather than military force, should form the backbone of U.S. efforts against al Qa?ida. And U.S. policymakers should end the use of the phrase ?war on terrorism? since there is no battlefield solution to defeating al Qa?ida. |
| format | Online |
| id | doab-20.500.12854ir-114774 |
| institution | Directory of Open Access Books |
| language | eng |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| publishDateRange | 2023 |
| publishDateSort | 2023 |
| publisher | RAND Corporation |
| publisherStr | RAND Corporation |
| record_format | ojs |
| spelling | doab-20.500.12854ir-1147742024-03-29T19:30:39Z How Terrorist Groups End Jones, Seth G. Libicki, Martin C. Political Science Technology thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JP Politics and government::JPS International relations thema EDItEUR::T Technology, Engineering, Agriculture, Industrial processes::TT Other technologies and applied sciences::TTM Military engineering All terrorist groups eventually end. But how do they end? The evidence since 1968 indicates that most groups have ended because (1) they joined the political process (43 percent) or (2) local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members (40 percent). Military force has rarely been the primary reason for the end of terrorist groups, and few groups within this time frame have achieved victory. This has significant implications for dealing with al Qa?ida and suggests fundamentally rethinking post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism strategy: Policymakers need to understand where to prioritize their efforts with limited resources and attention. The authors report that religious terrorist groups take longer to eliminate than other groups and rarely achieve their objectives. The largest groups achieve their goals more often and last longer than the smallest ones do. Finally, groups from upper-income countries are more likely to be left-wing or nationalist and less likely to have religion as their motivation. The authors conclude that policing and intelligence, rather than military force, should form the backbone of U.S. efforts against al Qa?ida. And U.S. policymakers should end the use of the phrase ?war on terrorism? since there is no battlefield solution to defeating al Qa?ida. 2023-10-05T10:16:40Z 2023-10-05T10:16:40Z 2008 book ONIX_20231005_9780833046406_548 9780833046406 9780833044655 https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/114774 eng image/jpeg n/a https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/MG741RC RAND Corporation 10.7249/MG741RC 10.7249/MG741RC 47ac0b54-b121-491c-a9c8-5ca6776e27cb 9780833046406 9780833044655 open access |
| spellingShingle | Political Science Technology thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JP Politics and government::JPS International relations thema EDItEUR::T Technology, Engineering, Agriculture, Industrial processes::TT Other technologies and applied sciences::TTM Military engineering Jones, Seth G. Libicki, Martin C. How Terrorist Groups End |
| title | How Terrorist Groups End |
| title_full | How Terrorist Groups End |
| title_fullStr | How Terrorist Groups End |
| title_full_unstemmed | How Terrorist Groups End |
| title_short | How Terrorist Groups End |
| title_sort | how terrorist groups end |
| topic | Political Science Technology thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JP Politics and government::JPS International relations thema EDItEUR::T Technology, Engineering, Agriculture, Industrial processes::TT Other technologies and applied sciences::TTM Military engineering |
| topic_facet | Political Science Technology thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JP Politics and government::JPS International relations thema EDItEUR::T Technology, Engineering, Agriculture, Industrial processes::TT Other technologies and applied sciences::TTM Military engineering |
| url | ONIX_20231005_9780833046406_548 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT jonessethg howterroristgroupsend AT libickimartinc howterroristgroupsend |