Air Power as a Coercive Instrument
Coercion--the use of threatened force to induce an adversary to change its behavior--is a critical function of the U.S. military. U.S. forces have recently fought in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa to compel recalcitrant regimes and warlords to stop repression, abandon weapons...
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| Médium: | Online |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
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RAND Corporation
2023
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| On-line přístup: | ONIX_20231005_9780833048288_601 |
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| _version_ | 1869531359801769984 |
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| author | Byman, Daniel McGinn, John G. Crane, Keith Jones, Seth G. Lal, Rollie |
| author_browse | Byman, Daniel Crane, Keith Jones, Seth G. Lal, Rollie McGinn, John G. |
| author_facet | Byman, Daniel McGinn, John G. Crane, Keith Jones, Seth G. Lal, Rollie |
| author_sort | Byman, Daniel |
| collection | Directory of Open Access Books |
| description | Coercion--the use of threatened force to induce an adversary to change its behavior--is a critical function of the U.S. military. U.S. forces have recently fought in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa to compel recalcitrant regimes and warlords to stop repression, abandon weapons programs, permit humanitarian relief, and otherwise modify their actions. Yet despite its overwhelming military might, the United States often fails to coerce successfully. This report examines the phenomenon of coercion and how air power can contribute to its success. Three factors increase the likelihood of successful coercion: (1) the coercer's ability to raise the costs it imposes while denying the adversary the chance to respond (escalation dominance); (2) an ability to block an adversary's military strategy for victory; and (3) an ability to magnify third-party threats, such as internal instability or the danger posed by another enemy. Domestic political concerns (such as casualty sensitivity) and coalition dynamics often constrain coercive operations and impair the achievement of these conditions. Air power can deliver potent and credible threats that foster the above factors while neutralizing adversary countercoercive moves. When the favorable factors are absent, however, air power--or any other military instrument--will probably fail to coerce. Policymakers' use of coercive air power under inauspicious conditions diminishes the chances of using it elsewhere when the prospects of success would be greater. |
| format | Online |
| id | doab-20.500.12854ir-114827 |
| institution | Directory of Open Access Books |
| language | eng |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| publishDateRange | 2023 |
| publishDateSort | 2023 |
| publisher | RAND Corporation |
| publisherStr | RAND Corporation |
| record_format | ojs |
| spelling | doab-20.500.12854ir-1148272024-03-29T19:30:56Z Air Power as a Coercive Instrument Byman, Daniel McGinn, John G. Crane, Keith Jones, Seth G. Lal, Rollie Political Science thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JW Warfare and defence Coercion--the use of threatened force to induce an adversary to change its behavior--is a critical function of the U.S. military. U.S. forces have recently fought in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa to compel recalcitrant regimes and warlords to stop repression, abandon weapons programs, permit humanitarian relief, and otherwise modify their actions. Yet despite its overwhelming military might, the United States often fails to coerce successfully. This report examines the phenomenon of coercion and how air power can contribute to its success. Three factors increase the likelihood of successful coercion: (1) the coercer's ability to raise the costs it imposes while denying the adversary the chance to respond (escalation dominance); (2) an ability to block an adversary's military strategy for victory; and (3) an ability to magnify third-party threats, such as internal instability or the danger posed by another enemy. Domestic political concerns (such as casualty sensitivity) and coalition dynamics often constrain coercive operations and impair the achievement of these conditions. Air power can deliver potent and credible threats that foster the above factors while neutralizing adversary countercoercive moves. When the favorable factors are absent, however, air power--or any other military instrument--will probably fail to coerce. Policymakers' use of coercive air power under inauspicious conditions diminishes the chances of using it elsewhere when the prospects of success would be greater. 2023-10-05T10:17:50Z 2023-10-05T10:17:50Z 1999 book ONIX_20231005_9780833048288_601 9780833048288 9780833027436 https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/114827 eng image/jpeg n/a https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/MR1061AF RAND Corporation 10.7249/MR1061AF 10.7249/MR1061AF 47ac0b54-b121-491c-a9c8-5ca6776e27cb 9780833048288 9780833027436 open access |
| spellingShingle | Political Science thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JW Warfare and defence Byman, Daniel McGinn, John G. Crane, Keith Jones, Seth G. Lal, Rollie Air Power as a Coercive Instrument |
| title | Air Power as a Coercive Instrument |
| title_full | Air Power as a Coercive Instrument |
| title_fullStr | Air Power as a Coercive Instrument |
| title_full_unstemmed | Air Power as a Coercive Instrument |
| title_short | Air Power as a Coercive Instrument |
| title_sort | air power as a coercive instrument |
| topic | Political Science thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JW Warfare and defence |
| topic_facet | Political Science thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JW Warfare and defence |
| url | ONIX_20231005_9780833048288_601 |
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