Chapter 10 Troubles with the Orthogonality Thesis
This chapter evaluates some basic assumptions behind the “dual” theories of phenomenal consciousness and finds them problematic for at least some examples of conscious episodes. Because the dual theories claim to be universalist in nature, even small number of counterexamples damages their status. I...
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| Médium: | Online |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
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Taylor & Francis
2023
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| On-line přístup: | https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/85152 |
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| _version_ | 1869529739775967232 |
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| author | Hvorecký, Juraj |
| author_browse | Hvorecký, Juraj |
| author_facet | Hvorecký, Juraj |
| author_sort | Hvorecký, Juraj |
| collection | Directory of Open Access Books |
| description | This chapter evaluates some basic assumptions behind the “dual” theories of phenomenal consciousness and finds them problematic for at least some examples of conscious episodes. Because the dual theories claim to be universalist in nature, even small number of counterexamples damages their status. I will present evidence, both empirical and conceptual, that demonstrates untenability of the dualist assumptions that conscious phenomenality and its unconscious counterpart possess essentially the same qualities. In doing so, I will primarily attack the claim that is shared by many dual theorists that the procedure responsible for bringing phenomenal content into consciousness serves this sole function and does not influence phenomenal qualities of content. I use the term orthogonality, first introduced in Vosgerau et al. (2008), as a convenient shortcut for the conception in which consciousness and content come unproblematically apart. I will conclude by hinting at an alternative proposal that explains emergence of conscious phenomenality as a single step operation. |
| format | Online |
| id | doab-20.500.12854ir-121634 |
| institution | Directory of Open Access Books |
| language | eng |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| publishDateRange | 2023 |
| publishDateSort | 2023 |
| publisher | Taylor & Francis |
| publisherStr | Taylor & Francis |
| record_format | ojs |
| spelling | doab-20.500.12854ir-1216342025-03-12T19:50:52Z Chapter 10 Troubles with the Orthogonality Thesis Hvorecký, Juraj attention; higher-order theories of consciousness; inattentional blindness; masking; mental qualities; neurophenomenal structuralism; phenomenal content; unconscious mental states This chapter evaluates some basic assumptions behind the “dual” theories of phenomenal consciousness and finds them problematic for at least some examples of conscious episodes. Because the dual theories claim to be universalist in nature, even small number of counterexamples damages their status. I will present evidence, both empirical and conceptual, that demonstrates untenability of the dualist assumptions that conscious phenomenality and its unconscious counterpart possess essentially the same qualities. In doing so, I will primarily attack the claim that is shared by many dual theorists that the procedure responsible for bringing phenomenal content into consciousness serves this sole function and does not influence phenomenal qualities of content. I use the term orthogonality, first introduced in Vosgerau et al. (2008), as a convenient shortcut for the conception in which consciousness and content come unproblematically apart. I will conclude by hinting at an alternative proposal that explains emergence of conscious phenomenality as a single step operation. 2023-11-17T08:20:45Z 2023-11-17T08:20:45Z 2023-11-16T09:21:42Z 2024 chapter https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/85152 9781032529790 9781032529745 https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/121634 eng open access image/jpeg image/jpeg image/jpeg Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/20.500.12657/85152/1/9781003409526_10.4324_9781003409526-13.pdf https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/20.500.12657/85152/1/9781003409526_10.4324_9781003409526-13.pdf https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/20.500.12657/85152/1/9781003409526_10.4324_9781003409526-13.pdf Taylor & Francis Routledge 10.4324/ 9781003409526- 13 10.4324/ 9781003409526- 13 fa69b019-f4ee-4979-8d42-c6b6c476b5f0 Conscious and Unconscious Mentality 9781032529790 9781032529745 Routledge 12 open access |
| spellingShingle | attention; higher-order theories of consciousness; inattentional blindness; masking; mental qualities; neurophenomenal structuralism; phenomenal content; unconscious mental states Hvorecký, Juraj Chapter 10 Troubles with the Orthogonality Thesis |
| title | Chapter 10 Troubles with the Orthogonality Thesis |
| title_full | Chapter 10 Troubles with the Orthogonality Thesis |
| title_fullStr | Chapter 10 Troubles with the Orthogonality Thesis |
| title_full_unstemmed | Chapter 10 Troubles with the Orthogonality Thesis |
| title_short | Chapter 10 Troubles with the Orthogonality Thesis |
| title_sort | chapter 10 troubles with the orthogonality thesis |
| topic | attention; higher-order theories of consciousness; inattentional blindness; masking; mental qualities; neurophenomenal structuralism; phenomenal content; unconscious mental states |
| topic_facet | attention; higher-order theories of consciousness; inattentional blindness; masking; mental qualities; neurophenomenal structuralism; phenomenal content; unconscious mental states |
| url | https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/85152 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT hvoreckyjuraj chapter10troubleswiththeorthogonalitythesis |