Knowledge as a Mental State? A Study on Oxford Realism
Subject of this book is an epistemological consideration concerning the nature of knowledge. But other than the most essays on the subject of knowledge, here I am going to deal with a largely overlooked account to try to find an answer to the question of knowledge. This is the mental state account o...
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| 格式: | Online |
| 語言: | 英语 |
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Logos Verlag Berlin
2024
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| 主題: | |
| 在線閱讀: | ONIX_20240215_9783832525156_7 |
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| _version_ | 1869517798230720512 |
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| author | Kohne, Jens |
| author_browse | Kohne, Jens |
| author_facet | Kohne, Jens |
| author_sort | Kohne, Jens |
| collection | Directory of Open Access Books |
| description | Subject of this book is an epistemological consideration concerning the nature of knowledge. But other than the most essays on the subject of knowledge, here I am going to deal with a largely overlooked account to try to find an answer to the question of knowledge. This is the mental state account of knowledge. Or to put it into the main question: is knowledge a mental state? Now, the question is: Why is the epistemic thinking of Cook Wilson, Prichard and Austin afflicted with such ignorance in contemporary epistemic discussions? The answer is: an unreflected Platonian heritage during 2000 years of epistemic thinking -- a notion which is similar to a point Hetherington has called ``epistemic absolutism''. So my main conclusion here is: the JTB thesis (knowledge is some aspect of justified true belief) is insufficient in order to give an account of the nature of knowledge. A consequence from this is: all the epistemic theories which are dealing with the JTB thesis are based on deficient assumptions. Hence their results -- notably the well-known externalism/internalism debate - are insufficient, too. So, there is a need for a new theory of knowledge based on the MS thesis. |
| format | Online |
| id | doab-20.500.12854ir-134214 |
| institution | Directory of Open Access Books |
| language | eng |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| publishDateRange | 2024 |
| publishDateSort | 2024 |
| publisher | Logos Verlag Berlin |
| publisherStr | Logos Verlag Berlin |
| record_format | ojs |
| spelling | doab-20.500.12854ir-1342142024-04-05T17:30:01Z Knowledge as a Mental State? A Study on Oxford Realism Kohne, Jens Wissen Erkenntnistheorie John Cook Wilson Harold Arthur Prichard John Langshaw Austin thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy Subject of this book is an epistemological consideration concerning the nature of knowledge. But other than the most essays on the subject of knowledge, here I am going to deal with a largely overlooked account to try to find an answer to the question of knowledge. This is the mental state account of knowledge. Or to put it into the main question: is knowledge a mental state? Now, the question is: Why is the epistemic thinking of Cook Wilson, Prichard and Austin afflicted with such ignorance in contemporary epistemic discussions? The answer is: an unreflected Platonian heritage during 2000 years of epistemic thinking -- a notion which is similar to a point Hetherington has called ``epistemic absolutism''. So my main conclusion here is: the JTB thesis (knowledge is some aspect of justified true belief) is insufficient in order to give an account of the nature of knowledge. A consequence from this is: all the epistemic theories which are dealing with the JTB thesis are based on deficient assumptions. Hence their results -- notably the well-known externalism/internalism debate - are insufficient, too. So, there is a need for a new theory of knowledge based on the MS thesis. 2024-02-15T16:28:54Z 2024-02-15T16:28:54Z 2010 book ONIX_20240215_9783832525156_7 9783832525156 https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/134214 eng image/jpeg Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International https://www.logos-verlag.de/cgi-bin/engbuchmid?isbn=2515&lng=eng&id= https://www.logos-verlag.de/ebooks/OA/978-3-8325-2515-6.pdf Logos Verlag Berlin Logos Verlag Berlin 10.30819/2515 10.30819/2515 04b263a1-7fba-4491-9eae-1c394ac42fc3 9783832525156 Logos Verlag Berlin 136 Berlin open access |
| spellingShingle | Wissen Erkenntnistheorie John Cook Wilson Harold Arthur Prichard John Langshaw Austin thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy Kohne, Jens Knowledge as a Mental State? A Study on Oxford Realism |
| title | Knowledge as a Mental State? A Study on Oxford Realism |
| title_full | Knowledge as a Mental State? A Study on Oxford Realism |
| title_fullStr | Knowledge as a Mental State? A Study on Oxford Realism |
| title_full_unstemmed | Knowledge as a Mental State? A Study on Oxford Realism |
| title_short | Knowledge as a Mental State? A Study on Oxford Realism |
| title_sort | knowledge as a mental state a study on oxford realism |
| topic | Wissen Erkenntnistheorie John Cook Wilson Harold Arthur Prichard John Langshaw Austin thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy |
| topic_facet | Wissen Erkenntnistheorie John Cook Wilson Harold Arthur Prichard John Langshaw Austin thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy |
| url | ONIX_20240215_9783832525156_7 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT kohnejens knowledgeasamentalstateastudyonoxfordrealism |