Materielle Schranken der Stimmrechtsmacht im Recht der Unternehmensanleihe
»Limits to Majority Rule in German Corporate Bond Restructurings«: The German Bond Act (SchVG) has facilitated the restructuring of German corporate bonds since 2009. The key question that has remained unanswered so far is what limits the law places on bondholders with special interests who can use...
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| Materyal Türü: | Online |
| Dil: | Almanca |
| Baskı/Yayın Bilgisi: |
Duncker & Humblot
2024
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| Online Erişim: | https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/138785 |
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| Özet: | »Limits to Majority Rule in German Corporate Bond Restructurings«: The German Bond Act (SchVG) has facilitated the restructuring of German corporate bonds since 2009. The key question that has remained unanswered so far is what limits the law places on bondholders with special interests who can use their voting power to control the distribution of the restructuring burden or cause the restructuring attempt to fail. The author discusses approaches under bond law, proposals borrowed from corporate law and the general limits of private autonomous action. |
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