A Pluralist Theory of Perception

A new theory of perception that posits that conscious perception consists not of a single kind of awareness, but of two radically different kinds deployed in concert.Most contemporary theories of perception, including leading forms of representationalism and naive realism, are monistic: they assume...

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Հիմնական հեղինակ: Mehta, Neil
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Հրապարակվել է: The MIT Press 2024
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author Mehta, Neil
author_browse Mehta, Neil
author_facet Mehta, Neil
author_sort Mehta, Neil
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description A new theory of perception that posits that conscious perception consists not of a single kind of awareness, but of two radically different kinds deployed in concert.Most contemporary theories of perception, including leading forms of representationalism and naive realism, are monistic: they assume that to consciously perceive is to deploy only one kind of sensory awareness. In A Pluralist Theory of Perception, Neil Mehta instead argues for pluralism, which says that to consciously perceive is to deploy two very different kinds of sensory awareness in concert. Mehta argues that pluralism can simultaneously explain what is common to all forms of consciousness and what is distinctive about conscious perception.Mehta's preferred version of pluralism, which he calls rich pluralism, says that conscious perception is constituted by successful sensory representation and deep awareness. Successful sensory representation is a representational form of awareness whose targets include particulars. It is found in perceptions, whether conscious or unconscious, but not in hallucinations. By contrast, deep awareness is a nonrepresentational form of sensory awareness whose targets are certain universals—the sensory qualities. Deep awareness constitutes one kind of consciousness, it is common to conscious perceptions and hallucinations, and it reveals part of the essences of its targets. Mehta argues that although rich pluralism appears to be less parsimonious than monism, it is not. All monistic theories that are explanatorily adequate end up being even more complex than rich pluralism. Thus, rich pluralism is the most spartan theory that can shoulder the explanatory load.
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spelling doab-20.500.12854ir-1467702024-10-25T13:20:24Z A Pluralist Theory of Perception Mehta, Neil Conscious perception perceptual experience representationalism naïve realism pluralism revelation. thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTM Philosophy of mind thema EDItEUR::G Reference, Information and Interdisciplinary subjects::GT Interdisciplinary studies::GTK Cognitive studies A new theory of perception that posits that conscious perception consists not of a single kind of awareness, but of two radically different kinds deployed in concert.Most contemporary theories of perception, including leading forms of representationalism and naive realism, are monistic: they assume that to consciously perceive is to deploy only one kind of sensory awareness. In A Pluralist Theory of Perception, Neil Mehta instead argues for pluralism, which says that to consciously perceive is to deploy two very different kinds of sensory awareness in concert. Mehta argues that pluralism can simultaneously explain what is common to all forms of consciousness and what is distinctive about conscious perception.Mehta's preferred version of pluralism, which he calls rich pluralism, says that conscious perception is constituted by successful sensory representation and deep awareness. Successful sensory representation is a representational form of awareness whose targets include particulars. It is found in perceptions, whether conscious or unconscious, but not in hallucinations. By contrast, deep awareness is a nonrepresentational form of sensory awareness whose targets are certain universals—the sensory qualities. Deep awareness constitutes one kind of consciousness, it is common to conscious perceptions and hallucinations, and it reveals part of the essences of its targets. Mehta argues that although rich pluralism appears to be less parsimonious than monism, it is not. All monistic theories that are explanatorily adequate end up being even more complex than rich pluralism. Thus, rich pluralism is the most spartan theory that can shoulder the explanatory load. 2024-10-25T13:20:22Z 2024-10-25T13:20:22Z 2024 book ONIX_20241025_9780262379144_148 9780262379144 9780262548281 https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/146770 eng The MIT Press image/jpeg n/a https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/15485.001.0001 The MIT Press The MIT Press 10.7551/mitpress/15485.001.0001 10.7551/mitpress/15485.001.0001 ae0cf962-f685-4933-93d1-916defa5123d 9780262379144 9780262548281 The MIT Press 358 Cambridge open access
spellingShingle Conscious perception
perceptual experience
representationalism
naïve realism
pluralism
revelation.
thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTM Philosophy of mind
thema EDItEUR::G Reference, Information and Interdisciplinary subjects::GT Interdisciplinary studies::GTK Cognitive studies
Mehta, Neil
A Pluralist Theory of Perception
title A Pluralist Theory of Perception
title_full A Pluralist Theory of Perception
title_fullStr A Pluralist Theory of Perception
title_full_unstemmed A Pluralist Theory of Perception
title_short A Pluralist Theory of Perception
title_sort pluralist theory of perception
topic Conscious perception
perceptual experience
representationalism
naïve realism
pluralism
revelation.
thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTM Philosophy of mind
thema EDItEUR::G Reference, Information and Interdisciplinary subjects::GT Interdisciplinary studies::GTK Cognitive studies
topic_facet Conscious perception
perceptual experience
representationalism
naïve realism
pluralism
revelation.
thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTM Philosophy of mind
thema EDItEUR::G Reference, Information and Interdisciplinary subjects::GT Interdisciplinary studies::GTK Cognitive studies
url ONIX_20241025_9780262379144_148
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