Chapter Standards of Knowledge and the Rationality of Action
In the paper Pragmatic Encroachment is contested. Classical Bank Case is reassessed in terms of the distinction between knowledge and prediction made upon that knowledge and the ceteris paribus clause involved. It is demonstrated that knowledge relevant for the prediction in question cannot provide...
Enregistré dans:
| Auteur principal: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Online |
| Langue: | polonais |
| Publié: |
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
2025
|
| Accès en ligne: | ONIX_20250307_9788382200355_788 |
| Tags: |
Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!
|
| _version_ | 1869518830463614976 |
|---|---|
| author | Grobler, Adam |
| author_browse | Grobler, Adam |
| author_facet | Grobler, Adam |
| author_sort | Grobler, Adam |
| collection | Directory of Open Access Books |
| description | In the paper Pragmatic Encroachment is contested. Classical Bank Case is reassessed in terms of the distinction between knowledge and prediction made upon that knowledge and the ceteris paribus clause involved. It is demonstrated that knowledge relevant for the prediction in question cannot provide the subject with the probability estimates of predictions that are necessary for making a rational choice. In other cases, the rise of stakes is sometimes accompanied with epistemic reasons to suspend the relevant ceteris paribus clause. Finally, some cautious self-denials may be questionable and motivated by the considerations independent of stakes. In conclusion it is claimed that, instead of the plausibility of knowledge-ascription, it is how knowledge is applied to the choice of action that depends on the stakes. |
| format | Online |
| id | doab-20.500.12854ir-155363 |
| institution | Directory of Open Access Books |
| language | pol |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| publishDateRange | 2025 |
| publishDateSort | 2025 |
| publisher | Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego |
| publisherStr | Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego |
| record_format | ojs |
| spelling | doab-20.500.12854ir-1553632025-03-07T14:10:24Z Chapter Standards of Knowledge and the Rationality of Action Grobler, Adam In the paper Pragmatic Encroachment is contested. Classical Bank Case is reassessed in terms of the distinction between knowledge and prediction made upon that knowledge and the ceteris paribus clause involved. It is demonstrated that knowledge relevant for the prediction in question cannot provide the subject with the probability estimates of predictions that are necessary for making a rational choice. In other cases, the rise of stakes is sometimes accompanied with epistemic reasons to suspend the relevant ceteris paribus clause. Finally, some cautious self-denials may be questionable and motivated by the considerations independent of stakes. In conclusion it is claimed that, instead of the plausibility of knowledge-ascription, it is how knowledge is applied to the choice of action that depends on the stakes. 2025-03-07T14:10:22Z 2025-03-07T14:10:22Z 2020 chapter ONIX_20250307_9788382200355_788 9788382200355 9788382200348 https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/155363 pol image/jpeg Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International https://www.press.uni.lodz.pl/index.php/wul/catalog/book/213 Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego 10.18778/8220-034-8.13 In the paper Pragmatic Encroachment is contested. Classical Bank Case is reassessed in terms of the distinction between knowledge and prediction made upon that knowledge and the ceteris paribus clause involved. It is demonstrated that knowledge relevant for the prediction in question cannot provide the subject with the probability estimates of predictions that are necessary for making a rational choice. In other cases, the rise of stakes is sometimes accompanied with epistemic reasons to suspend the relevant ceteris paribus clause. Finally, some cautious self-denials may be questionable and motivated by the considerations independent of stakes. In conclusion it is claimed that, instead of the plausibility of knowledge-ascription, it is how knowledge is applied to the choice of action that depends on the stakes. 10.18778/8220-034-8.13 83bfe9c9-323d-4283-b087-d859fd9af314 9788382200355 9788382200348 189-204 open access |
| spellingShingle | Grobler, Adam Chapter Standards of Knowledge and the Rationality of Action |
| title | Chapter Standards of Knowledge and the Rationality of Action |
| title_full | Chapter Standards of Knowledge and the Rationality of Action |
| title_fullStr | Chapter Standards of Knowledge and the Rationality of Action |
| title_full_unstemmed | Chapter Standards of Knowledge and the Rationality of Action |
| title_short | Chapter Standards of Knowledge and the Rationality of Action |
| title_sort | chapter standards of knowledge and the rationality of action |
| url | ONIX_20250307_9788382200355_788 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT grobleradam chapterstandardsofknowledgeandtherationalityofaction |