The Material Mind

The idea that persons or animals possess properties of two types, physical and mental, or psychological and cognitive, inevitably raises the question of how such cognitive properties can be causally efficacious, with respect to other cognitive, physiological, or physical properties, of the person he...

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Autor principal: Kistler, Max
Formato: Online
Idioma:inglês
francês
Publicado em: University of Calgary Press 2025
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Acesso em linha:https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/101138
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author Kistler, Max
author_browse Kistler, Max
author_facet Kistler, Max
author_sort Kistler, Max
collection Directory of Open Access Books
description The idea that persons or animals possess properties of two types, physical and mental, or psychological and cognitive, inevitably raises the question of how such cognitive properties can be causally efficacious, with respect to other cognitive, physiological, or physical properties, of the person herself or her environment. People, though composed exclusively of atoms like any other material object, have emergent properties that none of those components possess. Among them are cognitive properties. These properties give a person the power to cause both cognitive and physiological events and processes. The Material Mind defends a version of reductionist materialism. It modifies the conceptual framework of the debate by situating psychological and physiological properties of persons within a hierarchy of levels of reality. The Material Mind develops a concept of reduction that is compatible both with scientific change and with the possibility of multiple reduction bases. It shows that cognitive and other higher-level properties can be construed as causal powers, develops a concept of emergence compatible with reduction, and shows that the integration of the mind into a scientific conception of the world does not deprive mental properties and events of causal efficacy. The book defends the possibility of downward causation of physiological effects by cognitive causes, by questioning the justification of both the principle of the causal closure of the physical domain and the principle of causal-explanatory exclusion.
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spelling doab-20.500.12854ir-1588862025-04-25T04:01:21Z The Material Mind Kistler, Max metaphysics of mind;metaphysics of science;physicalism;special sciences;natural properties;natural;dispositional properties;casual power;causation;higher-level causation;downward causation;exclusion argument;physical closure The idea that persons or animals possess properties of two types, physical and mental, or psychological and cognitive, inevitably raises the question of how such cognitive properties can be causally efficacious, with respect to other cognitive, physiological, or physical properties, of the person herself or her environment. People, though composed exclusively of atoms like any other material object, have emergent properties that none of those components possess. Among them are cognitive properties. These properties give a person the power to cause both cognitive and physiological events and processes. The Material Mind defends a version of reductionist materialism. It modifies the conceptual framework of the debate by situating psychological and physiological properties of persons within a hierarchy of levels of reality. The Material Mind develops a concept of reduction that is compatible both with scientific change and with the possibility of multiple reduction bases. It shows that cognitive and other higher-level properties can be construed as causal powers, develops a concept of emergence compatible with reduction, and shows that the integration of the mind into a scientific conception of the world does not deprive mental properties and events of causal efficacy. The book defends the possibility of downward causation of physiological effects by cognitive causes, by questioning the justification of both the principle of the causal closure of the physical domain and the principle of causal-explanatory exclusion. 2025-04-25T04:01:20Z 2025-04-25T04:01:20Z 2025-04-24T08:16:19Z 2025 book https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/101138 9781773856063 https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/158886 eng fre open access image/jpeg Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/20.500.12657/101138/1/9781773856070.pdf University of Calgary Press University of Calgary Press 388fac32-9167-49a8-bb2b-bc9412a7d937 9781773856063 University of Calgary Press 306 Calgary open access
spellingShingle metaphysics of mind;metaphysics of science;physicalism;special sciences;natural properties;natural;dispositional properties;casual power;causation;higher-level causation;downward causation;exclusion argument;physical closure
Kistler, Max
The Material Mind
title The Material Mind
title_full The Material Mind
title_fullStr The Material Mind
title_full_unstemmed The Material Mind
title_short The Material Mind
title_sort material mind
topic metaphysics of mind;metaphysics of science;physicalism;special sciences;natural properties;natural;dispositional properties;casual power;causation;higher-level causation;downward causation;exclusion argument;physical closure
topic_facet metaphysics of mind;metaphysics of science;physicalism;special sciences;natural properties;natural;dispositional properties;casual power;causation;higher-level causation;downward causation;exclusion argument;physical closure
url https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/101138
work_keys_str_mv AT kistlermax thematerialmind
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