Strategic Responsiveness
Because the constitutional separation of powers often leads to delay or obstruction rather than coordinated policymaking, U.S. presidents are increasingly acting unilaterally to move policy. With the issuance of executive orders, signing statements, and policy memoranda, unilateralism has become a d...
Sábháilte in:
| Príomhchruthaitheoirí: | , , |
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| Formáid: | Online |
| Teanga: | Béarla |
| Foilsithe / Cruthaithe: |
University of Michigan Press
2025
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| Ábhair: | |
| Rochtain ar líne: | https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/101633 |
| Clibeanna: |
Níl clibeanna ann, Bí ar an gcéad duine le clib a chur leis an taifead seo!
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| _version_ | 1869515615662768128 |
|---|---|
| author | Ainsworth, Scott H Harward, Brian M Moffett, Kenneth W |
| author_browse | Ainsworth, Scott H Harward, Brian M Moffett, Kenneth W |
| author_facet | Ainsworth, Scott H Harward, Brian M Moffett, Kenneth W |
| author_sort | Ainsworth, Scott H |
| collection | Directory of Open Access Books |
| description | Because the constitutional separation of powers often leads to delay or obstruction rather than coordinated policymaking, U.S. presidents are increasingly acting unilaterally to move policy. With the issuance of executive orders, signing statements, and policy memoranda, unilateralism has become a defining feature of the American presidency. Can Congress effectively use checks and balances to counter presidential unilateralism?
Strategic Responsiveness takes a theoretically developed and empirically oriented approach— situated within legal and historical contexts—to explore the system of separated powers. The authors find that Congress is not as weak as many perceive it to be and show how members of Congress often anticipate individualized policy loss and choose to respond. These policy struggles shape the constitutional order as surely as broad, statutory constraints might. While the aggrandizement of the presidency and the usurpation of congressional control are not countered, ordinary policy losses are. For members and senators, presidential overreach is fine as long as the policy wins continue, but policy losses may motivate members to reassert congressional prerogatives in policymaking through increased oversight. Strategic Responsiveness reveals how profoundly important policy-level disputes are in the politics of maintaining a particular constitutional order. |
| format | Online |
| id | doab-20.500.12854ir-159434 |
| institution | Directory of Open Access Books |
| language | eng |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| publishDateRange | 2025 |
| publishDateSort | 2025 |
| publisher | University of Michigan Press |
| publisherStr | University of Michigan Press |
| record_format | ojs |
| spelling | doab-20.500.12854ir-1594342025-05-21T05:09:28Z Strategic Responsiveness Ainsworth, Scott H Harward, Brian M Moffett, Kenneth W president, presidency, unilateralism, unilateral, oversight, Congress, delegation, congressional delegation, discretion, signing statement, executive, executive order, separation of powers, imperial presidency, congressional hearing, policymaking, policy process, policy memoranda, unitary, unitary executive theory, member, senator, policy implementation, executive branch, legislative branch thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JP Politics and government thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JP Politics and government::JPH Political structure and processes::JPHV Political structures: democracy Because the constitutional separation of powers often leads to delay or obstruction rather than coordinated policymaking, U.S. presidents are increasingly acting unilaterally to move policy. With the issuance of executive orders, signing statements, and policy memoranda, unilateralism has become a defining feature of the American presidency. Can Congress effectively use checks and balances to counter presidential unilateralism? Strategic Responsiveness takes a theoretically developed and empirically oriented approach— situated within legal and historical contexts—to explore the system of separated powers. The authors find that Congress is not as weak as many perceive it to be and show how members of Congress often anticipate individualized policy loss and choose to respond. These policy struggles shape the constitutional order as surely as broad, statutory constraints might. While the aggrandizement of the presidency and the usurpation of congressional control are not countered, ordinary policy losses are. For members and senators, presidential overreach is fine as long as the policy wins continue, but policy losses may motivate members to reassert congressional prerogatives in policymaking through increased oversight. Strategic Responsiveness reveals how profoundly important policy-level disputes are in the politics of maintaining a particular constitutional order. 2025-05-14T04:10:02Z 2025-05-14T04:10:02Z 2025-05-13T07:33:41Z 2025 book https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/101633 9780472077410 9780472057412 https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/159434 eng Legislative Politics And Policy Making open access image/jpeg image/jpeg Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/20.500.12657/101633/1/9780472905010.pdf https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/20.500.12657/101633/1/9780472905010.pdf University of Michigan Press 10.3998/mpub.12581176 10.3998/mpub.12581176 b7359529-e5f7-4510-a59f-d7dafa1d4d17 9780472077410 9780472057412 215 open access |
| spellingShingle | president, presidency, unilateralism, unilateral, oversight, Congress, delegation, congressional delegation, discretion, signing statement, executive, executive order, separation of powers, imperial presidency, congressional hearing, policymaking, policy process, policy memoranda, unitary, unitary executive theory, member, senator, policy implementation, executive branch, legislative branch thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JP Politics and government thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JP Politics and government::JPH Political structure and processes::JPHV Political structures: democracy Ainsworth, Scott H Harward, Brian M Moffett, Kenneth W Strategic Responsiveness |
| title | Strategic Responsiveness |
| title_full | Strategic Responsiveness |
| title_fullStr | Strategic Responsiveness |
| title_full_unstemmed | Strategic Responsiveness |
| title_short | Strategic Responsiveness |
| title_sort | strategic responsiveness |
| topic | president, presidency, unilateralism, unilateral, oversight, Congress, delegation, congressional delegation, discretion, signing statement, executive, executive order, separation of powers, imperial presidency, congressional hearing, policymaking, policy process, policy memoranda, unitary, unitary executive theory, member, senator, policy implementation, executive branch, legislative branch thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JP Politics and government thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JP Politics and government::JPH Political structure and processes::JPHV Political structures: democracy |
| topic_facet | president, presidency, unilateralism, unilateral, oversight, Congress, delegation, congressional delegation, discretion, signing statement, executive, executive order, separation of powers, imperial presidency, congressional hearing, policymaking, policy process, policy memoranda, unitary, unitary executive theory, member, senator, policy implementation, executive branch, legislative branch thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JP Politics and government thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JP Politics and government::JPH Political structure and processes::JPHV Political structures: democracy |
| url | https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/101633 |
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