Responsibility for Rationality
This book develops the foundations of an ethics of mind by investigating the responsibility that is presupposed by the requirements of rationality that govern our attitudes. It thereby connects the most recent research on responsibility and rationality in a unifying dialectic. How can we be responsi...
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| Formato: | Online |
| Idioma: | inglês |
| Publicado em: |
Taylor & Francis
2025
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| Acesso em linha: | ONIX_20250515T115059_9781040260890_100 |
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| _version_ | 1869520443894923264 |
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| author | Schmidt, Sebastian |
| author_browse | Schmidt, Sebastian |
| author_facet | Schmidt, Sebastian |
| author_sort | Schmidt, Sebastian |
| collection | Directory of Open Access Books |
| description | This book develops the foundations of an ethics of mind by investigating the responsibility that is presupposed by the requirements of rationality that govern our attitudes. It thereby connects the most recent research on responsibility and rationality in a unifying dialectic. How can we be responsible for our attitudes if we cannot normally choose what we believe, desire, feel, and intend? This problem has received much attention during the last decades, both in epistemology and ethics. Yet, its connections to discussions about reasons and rationality have been largely overlooked. The book has five main goals. First, it reinterprets the problem of responsibility for attitudes as a problem about the normativity of rationality. Second, it connects substantive and structural rationality by drawing on debates about responsibility. Third, it supports recent accounts of the normativity of rationality by explicitly defending the view that epistemic reasons and other ‘right‑kind’ reasons are genuine normative reasons, and it does so by drawing on recent discussions about epistemic blame. Fourth, it breaks the stalemate between rationalist and voluntarist accounts of mental responsibility by proposing a hybrid view. Finally, it argues that being irrational can warrant moral blame, thus revealing an unnoticed normative force of rational requirements. Responsibility for Rationality is an original and essential resource for scholars and advanced students interested in connecting strands of normative theory within epistemology, metaethics, and moral psychology. The Open Access version of this book was published with the support of the Swiss National Science Foundation. |
| format | Online |
| id | doab-20.500.12854ir-159538 |
| institution | Directory of Open Access Books |
| language | eng |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| publishDateRange | 2025 |
| publishDateSort | 2025 |
| publisher | Taylor & Francis |
| publisherStr | Taylor & Francis |
| record_format | ojs |
| spelling | doab-20.500.12854ir-1595382025-05-16T06:07:43Z Responsibility for Rationality Schmidt, Sebastian Sebastian Schmidt epistemology ethics of belief responsibility blame rationality attitudes reasons ethics of mind norms normativity mental control epistemic rationality clutter avoidance irrationality indirect voluntarism indirect control reactive sentiments polarization thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTK Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTQ Ethics and moral philosophy thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTM Philosophy of mind thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JM Psychology This book develops the foundations of an ethics of mind by investigating the responsibility that is presupposed by the requirements of rationality that govern our attitudes. It thereby connects the most recent research on responsibility and rationality in a unifying dialectic. How can we be responsible for our attitudes if we cannot normally choose what we believe, desire, feel, and intend? This problem has received much attention during the last decades, both in epistemology and ethics. Yet, its connections to discussions about reasons and rationality have been largely overlooked. The book has five main goals. First, it reinterprets the problem of responsibility for attitudes as a problem about the normativity of rationality. Second, it connects substantive and structural rationality by drawing on debates about responsibility. Third, it supports recent accounts of the normativity of rationality by explicitly defending the view that epistemic reasons and other ‘right‑kind’ reasons are genuine normative reasons, and it does so by drawing on recent discussions about epistemic blame. Fourth, it breaks the stalemate between rationalist and voluntarist accounts of mental responsibility by proposing a hybrid view. Finally, it argues that being irrational can warrant moral blame, thus revealing an unnoticed normative force of rational requirements. Responsibility for Rationality is an original and essential resource for scholars and advanced students interested in connecting strands of normative theory within epistemology, metaethics, and moral psychology. The Open Access version of this book was published with the support of the Swiss National Science Foundation. 2025-05-16T06:07:42Z 2025-05-16T06:07:42Z 2025-05-15T10:13:38Z 2024 book ONIX_20250515T115059_9781040260890_100 https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/101850 9781040260890 9781040260906 9781003382973 9781032467177 https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/159538 eng Routledge Studies in Epistemology open access image/jpeg Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/20.500.12657/101850/1/9781040260890.pdf Taylor & Francis Routledge 10.4324/9781003382973 10.4324/9781003382973 fa69b019-f4ee-4979-8d42-c6b6c476b5f0 07f61e34-5b96-49f0-9860-c87dd8228f26 4bb461ae-a887-4564-b3a7-29e6d7e08318 9781040260890 9781040260906 9781003382973 9781032467177 Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF) Routledge 212 Oxford [...] Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung ror.org/00yjd3n13 open access |
| spellingShingle | Sebastian Schmidt epistemology ethics of belief responsibility blame rationality attitudes reasons ethics of mind norms normativity mental control epistemic rationality clutter avoidance irrationality indirect voluntarism indirect control reactive sentiments polarization thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTK Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTQ Ethics and moral philosophy thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTM Philosophy of mind thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JM Psychology Schmidt, Sebastian Responsibility for Rationality |
| title | Responsibility for Rationality |
| title_full | Responsibility for Rationality |
| title_fullStr | Responsibility for Rationality |
| title_full_unstemmed | Responsibility for Rationality |
| title_short | Responsibility for Rationality |
| title_sort | responsibility for rationality |
| topic | Sebastian Schmidt epistemology ethics of belief responsibility blame rationality attitudes reasons ethics of mind norms normativity mental control epistemic rationality clutter avoidance irrationality indirect voluntarism indirect control reactive sentiments polarization thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTK Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTQ Ethics and moral philosophy thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTM Philosophy of mind thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JM Psychology |
| topic_facet | Sebastian Schmidt epistemology ethics of belief responsibility blame rationality attitudes reasons ethics of mind norms normativity mental control epistemic rationality clutter avoidance irrationality indirect voluntarism indirect control reactive sentiments polarization thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTK Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTQ Ethics and moral philosophy thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTM Philosophy of mind thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JM Psychology |
| url | ONIX_20250515T115059_9781040260890_100 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT schmidtsebastian responsibilityforrationality |