Models in Political Economy
This volume explores topics that lie at the core of political economy: collective choice, voting, elections, bargaining, and rebellion. It presents the main formal models used to study the behavior of individuals and groups in political contexts, from choosing public policies and participating as vo...
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| Formato: | Online |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| Publicado: |
Open Book Publishers
2025
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| Acceso en liña: | ONIX_20250918T092426_9781805117087_4 |
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| _version_ | 1869527236288184320 |
|---|---|
| author | Osborne, Martin |
| author_browse | Osborne, Martin |
| author_facet | Osborne, Martin |
| author_sort | Osborne, Martin |
| collection | Directory of Open Access Books |
| description | This volume explores topics that lie at the core of political economy: collective choice, voting, elections, bargaining, and rebellion. It presents the main formal models used to study the behavior of individuals and groups in political contexts, from choosing public policies and participating as voters and candidates in elections, to staging revolutions. Complete mathematical proofs are provided, to clarify the assumptions and deepen understanding. Part I presents models of collective choice. The main question is whether methods exist for selecting a reasonable compromise when individuals’ preferences differ. Models of voting are studied in Part II. Included are models in which the individuals differ in their preferences as well as ones in which they differ in their information. One chapter considers the implications of individuals having ethical concerns, and another studies a model of sequential voting. Models of electoral competition, under the assumption of various motivations for the candidates, are discussed in Part III. One chapter is devoted to the application of these models to the study of redistributive policy. The book concludes with Part IV, which covers models of bargaining and rebellion. The book offers a rigorous yet accessible foundation for understanding how formal tools can illuminate political phenomena. |
| format | Online |
| id | doab-20.500.12854ir-166593 |
| institution | Directory of Open Access Books |
| language | eng |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| publishDateRange | 2025 |
| publishDateSort | 2025 |
| publisher | Open Book Publishers |
| publisherStr | Open Book Publishers |
| record_format | ojs |
| spelling | doab-20.500.12854ir-1665932025-09-19T05:02:09Z Models in Political Economy Osborne, Martin Political economy Formal models Game theory Collective choice Voting theory Electoral competition thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JP Politics and government::JPQ Central / national / federal government::JPQB Central / national / federal government policies thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JP Politics and government::JPH Political structure and processes::JPHV Political structures: democracy thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JP Politics and government::JPH Political structure and processes thema EDItEUR::K Economics, Finance, Business and Management::KC Economics::KCA Economic theory and philosophy thema EDItEUR::G Reference, Information and Interdisciplinary subjects::GP Research and information: general::GPQ Decision theory: general This volume explores topics that lie at the core of political economy: collective choice, voting, elections, bargaining, and rebellion. It presents the main formal models used to study the behavior of individuals and groups in political contexts, from choosing public policies and participating as voters and candidates in elections, to staging revolutions. Complete mathematical proofs are provided, to clarify the assumptions and deepen understanding. Part I presents models of collective choice. The main question is whether methods exist for selecting a reasonable compromise when individuals’ preferences differ. Models of voting are studied in Part II. Included are models in which the individuals differ in their preferences as well as ones in which they differ in their information. One chapter considers the implications of individuals having ethical concerns, and another studies a model of sequential voting. Models of electoral competition, under the assumption of various motivations for the candidates, are discussed in Part III. One chapter is devoted to the application of these models to the study of redistributive policy. The book concludes with Part IV, which covers models of bargaining and rebellion. The book offers a rigorous yet accessible foundation for understanding how formal tools can illuminate political phenomena. 2025-09-19T05:02:08Z 2025-09-19T05:02:08Z 2025-09-18T07:28:39Z 2025 book ONIX_20250918T092426_9781805117087_4 https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/106029 9781805117087 9781805117063 9781805117070 https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/166593 eng open access image/jpeg Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/20.500.12657/106029/1/9781805117087.pdf Open Book Publishers Open Book Publishers 10.11647/OBP.0490 10.11647/OBP.0490 b014b543-78bd-4c3b-bc71-b68e2ac855b9 9781805117087 9781805117063 9781805117070 Open Book Publishers 552 Cambridge, UK open access |
| spellingShingle | Political economy Formal models Game theory Collective choice Voting theory Electoral competition thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JP Politics and government::JPQ Central / national / federal government::JPQB Central / national / federal government policies thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JP Politics and government::JPH Political structure and processes::JPHV Political structures: democracy thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JP Politics and government::JPH Political structure and processes thema EDItEUR::K Economics, Finance, Business and Management::KC Economics::KCA Economic theory and philosophy thema EDItEUR::G Reference, Information and Interdisciplinary subjects::GP Research and information: general::GPQ Decision theory: general Osborne, Martin Models in Political Economy |
| title | Models in Political Economy |
| title_full | Models in Political Economy |
| title_fullStr | Models in Political Economy |
| title_full_unstemmed | Models in Political Economy |
| title_short | Models in Political Economy |
| title_sort | models in political economy |
| topic | Political economy Formal models Game theory Collective choice Voting theory Electoral competition thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JP Politics and government::JPQ Central / national / federal government::JPQB Central / national / federal government policies thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JP Politics and government::JPH Political structure and processes::JPHV Political structures: democracy thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JP Politics and government::JPH Political structure and processes thema EDItEUR::K Economics, Finance, Business and Management::KC Economics::KCA Economic theory and philosophy thema EDItEUR::G Reference, Information and Interdisciplinary subjects::GP Research and information: general::GPQ Decision theory: general |
| topic_facet | Political economy Formal models Game theory Collective choice Voting theory Electoral competition thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JP Politics and government::JPQ Central / national / federal government::JPQB Central / national / federal government policies thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JP Politics and government::JPH Political structure and processes::JPHV Political structures: democracy thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JP Politics and government::JPH Political structure and processes thema EDItEUR::K Economics, Finance, Business and Management::KC Economics::KCA Economic theory and philosophy thema EDItEUR::G Reference, Information and Interdisciplinary subjects::GP Research and information: general::GPQ Decision theory: general |
| url | ONIX_20250918T092426_9781805117087_4 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT osbornemartin modelsinpoliticaleconomy |