Unexplained Wealth Orders and the UK's Anti-Corruption Regime

The powers available to criminal enforcement authorities to investigate and seize the UK-based proceeds of overseas grand corruption are piecemeal in nature and collectively under-researched. In considering how the UK uses its laws to address the proceeds of overseas political corruption being laund...

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Bibliografiske detaljer
Hovedforfatter: Clancy, Áine
Format: Online
Sprog:engelsk
Udgivet: Oxford University Press 2026
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Online adgang:https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/111773
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Summary:The powers available to criminal enforcement authorities to investigate and seize the UK-based proceeds of overseas grand corruption are piecemeal in nature and collectively under-researched. In considering how the UK uses its laws to address the proceeds of overseas political corruption being laundered within its territory, this monograph examines the broader anti-corruption enforcement architecture of a ‘destination’ country for the proceeds of grand corruption. This volume uses the introduction and operation of the politically exposed person-specific unexplained wealth order as a lens through which to assess the UK’s anti-corruption regime. It provides an in-depth critical examination of the pitfalls, the benefits, and the efficacy of the options available to countries acting as haven states for corruptly acquired wealth in deterring the laundering of ‘dirty money’ in their states and interrogates the political motivations underpinning the introduction of those measures. It considers the relative advantages and disadvantages of various legal routes to recovering and, where appropriate, to returning misappropriated assets to states of origin. This work provides an essential resource with which to inform current policy and future reform of anti-corruption regimes both in the UK and in other states harbouring corruptly acquired assets originating overseas.