Epistemic Duties

There are arguably moral, legal, and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address this and closely related...

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Հրապարակվել է: Taylor & Francis 2021
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collection Directory of Open Access Books
description There are arguably moral, legal, and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address this and closely related questions from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles. It features a wide variety of positions, ranging from arguments for and against the existence of purely epistemic requirements, reductions of epistemic requirements to moral or prudential requirements, the biological foundations of epistemic requirements, extensions of the scope of epistemic requirements to include such things as open-mindedness, eradication of implicit bias and interpersonal duties to object, to new applications such as epistemic requirements pertaining to storytelling, testimony, and fundamentalist beliefs. Anyone interested in the nature of responsibility, belief, or epistemic normativity will find a range of useful arguments and fresh ideas in this cutting-edge anthology.
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publishDate 2021
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publisherStr Taylor & Francis
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spelling doab-20.500.12854ir-263202025-07-30T08:59:04Z Epistemic Duties McCain, Kevin Stapleford, Scott Andrew Reisner Anne Meylan Anthony Robert Booth belief Clayton Littlejohn dialogical foundationalism doxastic dilemma doxastic duties Ema Sullivan-Bissett epistemic duties epistemic normativity epistemic obligation epistemic tension epistemology evidence functions implicit bias Jennifer Lackey Jonathan Matheson Kevin McCain Lindsay Rettler Lisa Bortolotti Luis Oliveira Mark T. Nelson Matthias Steup Miriam Schleifer McCormick obligation open-mindedness ought to believe ought to reflect thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTK Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTK Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge There are arguably moral, legal, and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address this and closely related questions from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles. It features a wide variety of positions, ranging from arguments for and against the existence of purely epistemic requirements, reductions of epistemic requirements to moral or prudential requirements, the biological foundations of epistemic requirements, extensions of the scope of epistemic requirements to include such things as open-mindedness, eradication of implicit bias and interpersonal duties to object, to new applications such as epistemic requirements pertaining to storytelling, testimony, and fundamentalist beliefs. Anyone interested in the nature of responsibility, belief, or epistemic normativity will find a range of useful arguments and fresh ideas in this cutting-edge anthology. 2021-02-10T13:01:40Z 2021-02-10T13:01:40Z 2021-02-02T14:44:48Z 2020 book ONIX_20210202_9780429641794_47 ONIX_20210202_9780429641794_47 OCN: 1145081047 https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/46439 9780429030215 https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/26320 eng Routledge Studies in Epistemology open access Taylor & Francis Routledge 10.4324/9780429030215 10.4324/9780429030215 fa69b019-f4ee-4979-8d42-c6b6c476b5f0 Chapter 14 Responsibility for Fundamentalist Belief Chapter 14 Responsibility for Fundamentalist Belief 9780429030215 Routledge 314 open access
spellingShingle Andrew Reisner
Anne Meylan
Anthony Robert Booth
belief
Clayton Littlejohn
dialogical foundationalism
doxastic dilemma
doxastic duties
Ema Sullivan-Bissett
epistemic duties
epistemic normativity
epistemic obligation
epistemic tension
epistemology
evidence
functions
implicit bias
Jennifer Lackey
Jonathan Matheson
Kevin McCain
Lindsay Rettler
Lisa Bortolotti
Luis Oliveira
Mark T. Nelson
Matthias Steup
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
obligation
open-mindedness
ought to believe
ought to reflect
thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy
thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTK Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge
thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy
thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTK Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge
Epistemic Duties
title Epistemic Duties
title_full Epistemic Duties
title_fullStr Epistemic Duties
title_full_unstemmed Epistemic Duties
title_short Epistemic Duties
title_sort epistemic duties
topic Andrew Reisner
Anne Meylan
Anthony Robert Booth
belief
Clayton Littlejohn
dialogical foundationalism
doxastic dilemma
doxastic duties
Ema Sullivan-Bissett
epistemic duties
epistemic normativity
epistemic obligation
epistemic tension
epistemology
evidence
functions
implicit bias
Jennifer Lackey
Jonathan Matheson
Kevin McCain
Lindsay Rettler
Lisa Bortolotti
Luis Oliveira
Mark T. Nelson
Matthias Steup
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
obligation
open-mindedness
ought to believe
ought to reflect
thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy
thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTK Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge
thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy
thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTK Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge
topic_facet Andrew Reisner
Anne Meylan
Anthony Robert Booth
belief
Clayton Littlejohn
dialogical foundationalism
doxastic dilemma
doxastic duties
Ema Sullivan-Bissett
epistemic duties
epistemic normativity
epistemic obligation
epistemic tension
epistemology
evidence
functions
implicit bias
Jennifer Lackey
Jonathan Matheson
Kevin McCain
Lindsay Rettler
Lisa Bortolotti
Luis Oliveira
Mark T. Nelson
Matthias Steup
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
obligation
open-mindedness
ought to believe
ought to reflect
thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy
thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTK Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge
thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy
thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTK Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge
url ONIX_20210202_9780429641794_47