Chapter 14 Responsibility for Fundamentalist Belief
There are arguably moral, legal, and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address this and closely related...
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| Format: | Online |
| Language: | English |
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Taylor & Francis
2021
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| Online Access: | ONIX_20210202_9780429641794_chpt_40 |
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| _version_ | 1869529208566317056 |
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| author | Peels, Rik |
| author_browse | Peels, Rik |
| author_facet | Peels, Rik |
| author_sort | Peels, Rik |
| collection | Directory of Open Access Books |
| description | There are arguably moral, legal, and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address this and closely related questions from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles. It features a wide variety of positions, ranging from arguments for and against the existence of purely epistemic requirements, reductions of epistemic requirements to moral or prudential requirements, the biological foundations of epistemic requirements, extensions of the scope of epistemic requirements to include such things as open-mindedness, eradication of implicit bias and interpersonal duties to object, to new applications such as epistemic requirements pertaining to storytelling, testimony, and fundamentalist beliefs. Anyone interested in the nature of responsibility, belief, or epistemic normativity will find a range of useful arguments and fresh ideas in this cutting-edge anthology. |
| format | Online |
| id | doab-20.500.12854ir-31493 |
| institution | Directory of Open Access Books |
| language | eng |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publishDateRange | 2021 |
| publishDateSort | 2021 |
| publisher | Taylor & Francis |
| publisherStr | Taylor & Francis |
| record_format | ojs |
| spelling | doab-20.500.12854ir-314932025-07-30T10:20:37Z Chapter 14 Responsibility for Fundamentalist Belief Peels, Rik Andrew Reisner Anne Meylan Anthony Robert Booth belief Clayton Littlejohn dialogical foundationalism doxastic dilemma doxastic duties Ema Sullivan-Bissett epistemic duties epistemic normativity epistemic obligation epistemic tension epistemology evidence functions implicit bias Jennifer Lackey Jonathan Matheson Kevin McCain Lindsay Rettler Lisa Bortolotti Luis Oliveira Mark T. Nelson Matthias Steup Miriam Schleifer McCormick obligation open-mindedness ought to believe ought to reflect thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTK Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTK Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge There are arguably moral, legal, and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address this and closely related questions from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles. It features a wide variety of positions, ranging from arguments for and against the existence of purely epistemic requirements, reductions of epistemic requirements to moral or prudential requirements, the biological foundations of epistemic requirements, extensions of the scope of epistemic requirements to include such things as open-mindedness, eradication of implicit bias and interpersonal duties to object, to new applications such as epistemic requirements pertaining to storytelling, testimony, and fundamentalist beliefs. Anyone interested in the nature of responsibility, belief, or epistemic normativity will find a range of useful arguments and fresh ideas in this cutting-edge anthology. 2021-02-10T13:51:02Z 2021-02-10T13:51:02Z 2021-02-02T15:02:16Z 2020 chapter ONIX_20210202_9780429641794_chpt_40 https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/46488 https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/31493 eng Routledge Studies in Epistemology open access image/jpeg image/jpeg image/jpeg Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/20.500.12657/46488/1/9780429641794-ch14.pdf https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/20.500.12657/46488/1/9780429641794-ch14.pdf https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/20.500.12657/46488/1/9780429641794-ch14.pdf Taylor & Francis Routledge fa69b019-f4ee-4979-8d42-c6b6c476b5f0 Epistemic Duties Epistemic Duties Routledge 18 open access |
| spellingShingle | Andrew Reisner Anne Meylan Anthony Robert Booth belief Clayton Littlejohn dialogical foundationalism doxastic dilemma doxastic duties Ema Sullivan-Bissett epistemic duties epistemic normativity epistemic obligation epistemic tension epistemology evidence functions implicit bias Jennifer Lackey Jonathan Matheson Kevin McCain Lindsay Rettler Lisa Bortolotti Luis Oliveira Mark T. Nelson Matthias Steup Miriam Schleifer McCormick obligation open-mindedness ought to believe ought to reflect thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTK Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTK Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge Peels, Rik Chapter 14 Responsibility for Fundamentalist Belief |
| title | Chapter 14 Responsibility for Fundamentalist Belief |
| title_full | Chapter 14 Responsibility for Fundamentalist Belief |
| title_fullStr | Chapter 14 Responsibility for Fundamentalist Belief |
| title_full_unstemmed | Chapter 14 Responsibility for Fundamentalist Belief |
| title_short | Chapter 14 Responsibility for Fundamentalist Belief |
| title_sort | chapter 14 responsibility for fundamentalist belief |
| topic | Andrew Reisner Anne Meylan Anthony Robert Booth belief Clayton Littlejohn dialogical foundationalism doxastic dilemma doxastic duties Ema Sullivan-Bissett epistemic duties epistemic normativity epistemic obligation epistemic tension epistemology evidence functions implicit bias Jennifer Lackey Jonathan Matheson Kevin McCain Lindsay Rettler Lisa Bortolotti Luis Oliveira Mark T. Nelson Matthias Steup Miriam Schleifer McCormick obligation open-mindedness ought to believe ought to reflect thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTK Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTK Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge |
| topic_facet | Andrew Reisner Anne Meylan Anthony Robert Booth belief Clayton Littlejohn dialogical foundationalism doxastic dilemma doxastic duties Ema Sullivan-Bissett epistemic duties epistemic normativity epistemic obligation epistemic tension epistemology evidence functions implicit bias Jennifer Lackey Jonathan Matheson Kevin McCain Lindsay Rettler Lisa Bortolotti Luis Oliveira Mark T. Nelson Matthias Steup Miriam Schleifer McCormick obligation open-mindedness ought to believe ought to reflect thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTK Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTK Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge |
| url | ONIX_20210202_9780429641794_chpt_40 |
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