Explaining Imagination
Imagination will remain a mystery—we will not be able to explain imagination—until we can break it into simpler parts that are more easily understood. Explaining Imagination is a guidebook for doing just that, where the simpler parts are other familiar mental states like beliefs, desires, judgments,...
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| Format: | Online |
| Język: | angielski |
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Oxford University Press
2021
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| Hasła przedmiotowe: | |
| Dostęp online: | OCN: 1182867644 |
| Etykiety: |
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| _version_ | 1869516617071722496 |
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| author | Langland-Hassan, Peter |
| author_browse | Langland-Hassan, Peter |
| author_facet | Langland-Hassan, Peter |
| author_sort | Langland-Hassan, Peter |
| collection | Directory of Open Access Books |
| description | Imagination will remain a mystery—we will not be able to explain imagination—until we can break it into simpler parts that are more easily understood. Explaining Imagination is a guidebook for doing just that, where the simpler parts are other familiar mental states like beliefs, desires, judgments, decisions, and intentions. In different combinations and contexts, these states constitute cases of imagining. This reductive approach to imagination is at direct odds with the current orthodoxy, which sees imagination as an irreducible, sui generis mental state or process—one that influences our judgments, beliefs, desires, and so on, without being constituted by them. Explaining Imagination looks closely at the main contexts where imagination is thought to be at work and argues that, in each case, the capacity is best explained by appeal to a person’s beliefs, judgments, desires, intentions, or decisions. The proper conclusion is not that there are no imaginings after all, but that these other states simply constitute the relevant cases of imagining. Contexts explored in depth include: hypothetical and counterfactual reasoning, engaging in pretense, appreciating fictions, and generating creative works. The special role of mental imagery within states like beliefs, desires, and judgments is explained in a way that is compatible with reducing imagination to more basic folk psychological states. A significant upshot is that, in order to create an artificial mind with an imagination, we need only give it these more ordinary mental states. |
| format | Online |
| id | doab-20.500.12854ir-34267 |
| institution | Directory of Open Access Books |
| language | eng |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publishDateRange | 2021 |
| publishDateSort | 2021 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| publisherStr | Oxford University Press |
| record_format | ojs |
| spelling | doab-20.500.12854ir-342672025-03-13T00:22:02Z Explaining Imagination Langland-Hassan, Peter imagination imagine mental imagery pretense folk psychology conditionals fiction creativity beliefs reduction thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTM Philosophy of mind thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JM Psychology::JMR Cognition and cognitive psychology thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTN Philosophy: aesthetics Imagination will remain a mystery—we will not be able to explain imagination—until we can break it into simpler parts that are more easily understood. Explaining Imagination is a guidebook for doing just that, where the simpler parts are other familiar mental states like beliefs, desires, judgments, decisions, and intentions. In different combinations and contexts, these states constitute cases of imagining. This reductive approach to imagination is at direct odds with the current orthodoxy, which sees imagination as an irreducible, sui generis mental state or process—one that influences our judgments, beliefs, desires, and so on, without being constituted by them. Explaining Imagination looks closely at the main contexts where imagination is thought to be at work and argues that, in each case, the capacity is best explained by appeal to a person’s beliefs, judgments, desires, intentions, or decisions. The proper conclusion is not that there are no imaginings after all, but that these other states simply constitute the relevant cases of imagining. Contexts explored in depth include: hypothetical and counterfactual reasoning, engaging in pretense, appreciating fictions, and generating creative works. The special role of mental imagery within states like beliefs, desires, and judgments is explained in a way that is compatible with reducing imagination to more basic folk psychological states. A significant upshot is that, in order to create an artificial mind with an imagination, we need only give it these more ordinary mental states. 2021-02-10T14:15:40Z 2021-02-10T14:15:40Z 2020-10-06T09:12:36Z 2020 book OCN: 1182867644 https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/42469 https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/34267 eng open access image/jpeg image/jpeg image/jpeg Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/20.500.12657/42469/1/9780198815068.pdf https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/20.500.12657/42469/1/9780198815068.pdf https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/20.500.12657/42469/1/9780198815068.pdf Oxford University Press 10.1093/oso/9780198815068.001.0001 10.1093/oso/9780198815068.001.0001 db4e319f-ca9f-449a-bcf2-37d7c6f885b1 University of Cincinnati 9af6327d-9973-4907-b2fa-9e8a4d9d2ccb 336 Oxford open access |
| spellingShingle | imagination imagine mental imagery pretense folk psychology conditionals fiction creativity beliefs reduction thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTM Philosophy of mind thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JM Psychology::JMR Cognition and cognitive psychology thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTN Philosophy: aesthetics Langland-Hassan, Peter Explaining Imagination |
| title | Explaining Imagination |
| title_full | Explaining Imagination |
| title_fullStr | Explaining Imagination |
| title_full_unstemmed | Explaining Imagination |
| title_short | Explaining Imagination |
| title_sort | explaining imagination |
| topic | imagination imagine mental imagery pretense folk psychology conditionals fiction creativity beliefs reduction thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTM Philosophy of mind thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JM Psychology::JMR Cognition and cognitive psychology thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTN Philosophy: aesthetics |
| topic_facet | imagination imagine mental imagery pretense folk psychology conditionals fiction creativity beliefs reduction thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTM Philosophy of mind thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JM Psychology::JMR Cognition and cognitive psychology thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTN Philosophy: aesthetics |
| url | OCN: 1182867644 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT langlandhassanpeter explainingimagination |