The Contents of Perceptual Experience. A Kantian Perspective
The book addresses the debate on whether the representational content of perceptual experience is conceptual or non-conceptual, by bringing out the points of comparison between Kant’s conception of intuition and the contemporary accounts of non-conceptual content, encountered in the writings of G. E...
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| Formatua: | Online |
| Hizkuntza: | ingelesa |
| Argitaratua: |
De Gruyter
2021
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| Gaiak: | |
| Sarrera elektronikoa: | 16487 |
| Etiketak: |
Etiketarik gabe, Izan zaitez lehena erregistro honi etiketa jartzen!
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| _version_ | 1869524759713153024 |
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| author | Tomaszewska, Anna |
| author_browse | Tomaszewska, Anna |
| author_facet | Tomaszewska, Anna |
| author_sort | Tomaszewska, Anna |
| collection | Directory of Open Access Books |
| description | The book addresses the debate on whether the representational content of perceptual experience is conceptual or non-conceptual, by bringing out the points of comparison between Kant’s conception of intuition and the contemporary accounts of non-conceptual content, encountered in the writings of G. Evans, Ch. Peacocke, F. Dretske, T. Crane, M. G. F. Martin, and others. Following R. Aquila’s reading of Kant’s conception of representation, the author argues that intuition (Anschauung, intuitus) provides the most basic form of intentionality – pre-conceptual reference to objects, which underlies the acts of conceptualization and judgment. The book advances an interpretation of Kant’s theory of experience in the light of such questions as: Does conscious perceptual experience of objects require that subjects possess concepts of these objects? Do the contents of experience differ from the contents of beliefs or judgments? And if they do, what accounts for this difference? These questions take us to the most puzzling philosophical topic of the relation between mind and world. Anna Tomaszewska argues that this relation does not involve conceptual capacities alone but also, on the most basic level of perceptual experience, pre-cognitive “sensible intuition,” enabling relatedness to objects that remains uninformed by concepts. In a nutshell, on her interpretation, Kant can be taken to subscribe to the view that perceptual cognition does not have rational underpinnings. |
| format | Online |
| id | doab-20.500.12854ir-43984 |
| institution | Directory of Open Access Books |
| language | eng |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publishDateRange | 2021 |
| publishDateSort | 2021 |
| publisher | De Gruyter |
| publisherStr | De Gruyter |
| record_format | ojs |
| spelling | doab-20.500.12854ir-439842024-04-05T17:30:20Z The Contents of Perceptual Experience. A Kantian Perspective Tomaszewska, Anna B1-5802 content of perception embodied cognition non-conceptualism Kant conceptualism thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy The book addresses the debate on whether the representational content of perceptual experience is conceptual or non-conceptual, by bringing out the points of comparison between Kant’s conception of intuition and the contemporary accounts of non-conceptual content, encountered in the writings of G. Evans, Ch. Peacocke, F. Dretske, T. Crane, M. G. F. Martin, and others. Following R. Aquila’s reading of Kant’s conception of representation, the author argues that intuition (Anschauung, intuitus) provides the most basic form of intentionality – pre-conceptual reference to objects, which underlies the acts of conceptualization and judgment. The book advances an interpretation of Kant’s theory of experience in the light of such questions as: Does conscious perceptual experience of objects require that subjects possess concepts of these objects? Do the contents of experience differ from the contents of beliefs or judgments? And if they do, what accounts for this difference? These questions take us to the most puzzling philosophical topic of the relation between mind and world. Anna Tomaszewska argues that this relation does not involve conceptual capacities alone but also, on the most basic level of perceptual experience, pre-cognitive “sensible intuition,” enabling relatedness to objects that remains uninformed by concepts. In a nutshell, on her interpretation, Kant can be taken to subscribe to the view that perceptual cognition does not have rational underpinnings. 2021-02-11T10:33:17Z 2021-02-11T10:33:17Z 2014-11-17 10:34:59 2014 book 16487 9783110377286 9783110372656 https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/43984 eng image/jpeg Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International https://doi.org/10.2478/9783110372656 De Gruyter 10.2478/9783110372656 10.2478/9783110372656 af2fbfcc-ee87-43d8-a035-afb9d7eef6a5 9783110377286 9783110372656 157 open access |
| spellingShingle | B1-5802 content of perception embodied cognition non-conceptualism Kant conceptualism thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy Tomaszewska, Anna The Contents of Perceptual Experience. A Kantian Perspective |
| title | The Contents of Perceptual Experience. A Kantian Perspective |
| title_full | The Contents of Perceptual Experience. A Kantian Perspective |
| title_fullStr | The Contents of Perceptual Experience. A Kantian Perspective |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Contents of Perceptual Experience. A Kantian Perspective |
| title_short | The Contents of Perceptual Experience. A Kantian Perspective |
| title_sort | contents of perceptual experience a kantian perspective |
| topic | B1-5802 content of perception embodied cognition non-conceptualism Kant conceptualism thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy |
| topic_facet | B1-5802 content of perception embodied cognition non-conceptualism Kant conceptualism thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy |
| url | 16487 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT tomaszewskaanna thecontentsofperceptualexperienceakantianperspective AT tomaszewskaanna contentsofperceptualexperienceakantianperspective |