From Is to Ought: The Place of Normative Models in the Study of Human Thought
In the study of human thinking, two main research questions can be asked: “Descriptive Q: What is human thinking like? Normative Q: What ought human thinking be like?” For decades, these two questions have dominated the field, and the relationship between them generated many a controversy. Empirical...
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| Format: | Online |
| Idioma: | anglès |
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Frontiers Media SA
2021
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| _version_ | 1869531070794301440 |
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| author | David E. Over Shira Elqayam |
| author_browse | David E. Over Shira Elqayam |
| author_facet | David E. Over Shira Elqayam |
| author_sort | David E. Over |
| collection | Directory of Open Access Books |
| description | In the study of human thinking, two main research questions can be asked: “Descriptive Q: What is human thinking like? Normative Q: What ought human thinking be like?” For decades, these two questions have dominated the field, and the relationship between them generated many a controversy. Empirical normativist approaches regard the answers to these questions as positively correlated – in essence, human thinking is what it ought to be (although what counts as the ‘ought’ standard is moot). In contemporary theories of reasoning and decision making, this is often associated with a Panglossian framework, an adaptationist approach which regards human thinking as a priori rational. In contrast, prescriptive normativism sees the answers to these two questions as negatively correlated. Normative models are still relevant to human thought, but human behaviour deviates from them quite markedly (with the invited conclusion that humans are often irrational). Prescriptive normativism often results in a Meliorist agenda, which sees rationality as amenable to education. Both empirical and prescriptive normativism can be contrasted with a descriptivist framework for psychology of human thinking. Following Hume’s strict divide between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’, descriptivism regards the descriptive and normative research questions as uncorrelated, or dissociated, with only the former question suitable for psychological study of human behaviour. This basic division carries over to the relation between normative (‘ought’) rationality, based on conforming to normative standards; and instrumental (‘is’) rationality, based on achieving one’s goals. Descriptivist approaches regard the two as dissociated, whereas normativist approaches tend to see them as closely linked, with normative arguments defining and justifying instrumental rationality. This research topic brings together diverse contributions to the continuing debate. Featuring contributions from leading researchers in the field, the e-book covers a wide range of subjects, arranged by six sections: The standard picture: Normativist perspectives In defence of soft normativism Exploring normative models Descriptivist perspectives Evolutionary and ecological accounts Empirical reports With a total of some 24 articles from 55 authors, this comprehensive treatment includes theoretical analyses, meta-theoretical critiques, commentaries, and a range of empirical reports. The contents of the Research Topic should appeal to psychologists, linguists, philosophers and cognitive scientists, with research interests in a wide range of domains, from language, through reasoning, judgment and decision making, and moral judgment, to epistemology and theory of mind, philosophical logic, and meta-ethics. |
| format | Online |
| id | doab-20.500.12854ir-48108 |
| institution | Directory of Open Access Books |
| language | eng |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publishDateRange | 2021 |
| publishDateSort | 2021 |
| publisher | Frontiers Media SA |
| publisherStr | Frontiers Media SA |
| record_format | ojs |
| spelling | doab-20.500.12854ir-481082024-03-29T08:01:53Z From Is to Ought: The Place of Normative Models in the Study of Human Thought David E. Over Shira Elqayam BF1-990 Q1-390 meliorism normative models new paradigm normativism moral judgment Bayesianism Panglossianism rationality Is-ought problem bic Book Industry Communication::J Society & social sciences::JM Psychology thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JM Psychology In the study of human thinking, two main research questions can be asked: “Descriptive Q: What is human thinking like? Normative Q: What ought human thinking be like?” For decades, these two questions have dominated the field, and the relationship between them generated many a controversy. Empirical normativist approaches regard the answers to these questions as positively correlated – in essence, human thinking is what it ought to be (although what counts as the ‘ought’ standard is moot). In contemporary theories of reasoning and decision making, this is often associated with a Panglossian framework, an adaptationist approach which regards human thinking as a priori rational. In contrast, prescriptive normativism sees the answers to these two questions as negatively correlated. Normative models are still relevant to human thought, but human behaviour deviates from them quite markedly (with the invited conclusion that humans are often irrational). Prescriptive normativism often results in a Meliorist agenda, which sees rationality as amenable to education. Both empirical and prescriptive normativism can be contrasted with a descriptivist framework for psychology of human thinking. Following Hume’s strict divide between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’, descriptivism regards the descriptive and normative research questions as uncorrelated, or dissociated, with only the former question suitable for psychological study of human behaviour. This basic division carries over to the relation between normative (‘ought’) rationality, based on conforming to normative standards; and instrumental (‘is’) rationality, based on achieving one’s goals. Descriptivist approaches regard the two as dissociated, whereas normativist approaches tend to see them as closely linked, with normative arguments defining and justifying instrumental rationality. This research topic brings together diverse contributions to the continuing debate. Featuring contributions from leading researchers in the field, the e-book covers a wide range of subjects, arranged by six sections: The standard picture: Normativist perspectives In defence of soft normativism Exploring normative models Descriptivist perspectives Evolutionary and ecological accounts Empirical reports With a total of some 24 articles from 55 authors, this comprehensive treatment includes theoretical analyses, meta-theoretical critiques, commentaries, and a range of empirical reports. The contents of the Research Topic should appeal to psychologists, linguists, philosophers and cognitive scientists, with research interests in a wide range of domains, from language, through reasoning, judgment and decision making, and moral judgment, to epistemology and theory of mind, philosophical logic, and meta-ethics. 2021-02-11T14:07:52Z 2021-02-11T14:07:52Z 2016-01-19 14:05:46 2016 book 18283 16648714 9782889198962 https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/48108 eng Frontiers Research Topics image/jpeg Attribution 4.0 International http://www.frontiersin.org/books/From_Is_to_Ought_The_Place_of_Normative_Models_in_the_Study_of_Human_Thought/959#nogo http://journal.frontiersin.org/researchtopic/1185/from-is-to-ought-the-place-of-normative-models-in-the-study-of-human-thought Frontiers Media SA 10.3389/978-2-88919-896-2 10.3389/978-2-88919-896-2 bf5ce210-e72e-4860-ba9b-c305640ff3ae 9782889198962 187 open access |
| spellingShingle | BF1-990 Q1-390 meliorism normative models new paradigm normativism moral judgment Bayesianism Panglossianism rationality Is-ought problem bic Book Industry Communication::J Society & social sciences::JM Psychology thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JM Psychology David E. Over Shira Elqayam From Is to Ought: The Place of Normative Models in the Study of Human Thought |
| title | From Is to Ought: The Place of Normative Models in the Study of Human Thought |
| title_full | From Is to Ought: The Place of Normative Models in the Study of Human Thought |
| title_fullStr | From Is to Ought: The Place of Normative Models in the Study of Human Thought |
| title_full_unstemmed | From Is to Ought: The Place of Normative Models in the Study of Human Thought |
| title_short | From Is to Ought: The Place of Normative Models in the Study of Human Thought |
| title_sort | from is to ought the place of normative models in the study of human thought |
| topic | BF1-990 Q1-390 meliorism normative models new paradigm normativism moral judgment Bayesianism Panglossianism rationality Is-ought problem bic Book Industry Communication::J Society & social sciences::JM Psychology thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JM Psychology |
| topic_facet | BF1-990 Q1-390 meliorism normative models new paradigm normativism moral judgment Bayesianism Panglossianism rationality Is-ought problem bic Book Industry Communication::J Society & social sciences::JM Psychology thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JM Psychology |
| url | 18283 |
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