Political Games: Strategy, Persuasion, and Learning
Political actors navigate a world of incomplete and noisy information. Voters make decisions about turnout and voting amidst campaign promises, credit claiming, and fake news. Policymakers experiment with reforms amidst uncertain predictions from experts and biased interest groups. Parties form coal...
Αποθηκεύτηκε σε:
| Κύριοι συγγραφείς: | , |
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| Μορφή: | Online |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έκδοση: |
MDPI - Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute
2021
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| Θέματα: | |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: | 44797 |
| Ετικέτες: |
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| _version_ | 1869530865263968256 |
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| author | Gratton, Gabriele Zudenkova, Galina |
| author_browse | Gratton, Gabriele Zudenkova, Galina |
| author_facet | Gratton, Gabriele Zudenkova, Galina |
| author_sort | Gratton, Gabriele |
| collection | Directory of Open Access Books |
| description | Political actors navigate a world of incomplete and noisy information. Voters make decisions about turnout and voting amidst campaign promises, credit claiming, and fake news. Policymakers experiment with reforms amidst uncertain predictions from experts and biased interest groups. Parties form coalitions and sign agreements amidst cheap talk and strategic communication. Beyond democracies, autocrats and dictators rule under uncertain threats to their regimes. In all of these environments, some political actors have incentives to learn and gather information, while others have incentives to influence and manipulate this information. This Special Issue addresses the question of how information structures, information transmission, and communication technologies influence political environments and affect the incentives faced by political actors. This is a collection of articles, combining game-theoretical and experimental work. The articles promote novel ideas and address understudied questions, which range from salience determination to microtargeting, ambiguous voting and information naivety. The findings complement the existing literature and suggest rationales for inefficiencies that arise in political environments with incomplete and noisy information. |
| format | Online |
| id | doab-20.500.12854ir-56543 |
| institution | Directory of Open Access Books |
| language | eng |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publishDateRange | 2021 |
| publishDateSort | 2021 |
| publisher | MDPI - Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute |
| publisherStr | MDPI - Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute |
| record_format | ojs |
| spelling | doab-20.500.12854ir-565432024-04-05T17:30:34Z Political Games: Strategy, Persuasion, and Learning Gratton, Gabriele Zudenkova, Galina B1-5802 correlation neglect n/a voting experiment mutual optimism pivotality incentives to go to war jury trial ambiguity multidimensional policy space electoral competition recency bias negative campaigning strategic disclosure information committee decision making microtargeting office-motivated candidates information aggregation thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy Political actors navigate a world of incomplete and noisy information. Voters make decisions about turnout and voting amidst campaign promises, credit claiming, and fake news. Policymakers experiment with reforms amidst uncertain predictions from experts and biased interest groups. Parties form coalitions and sign agreements amidst cheap talk and strategic communication. Beyond democracies, autocrats and dictators rule under uncertain threats to their regimes. In all of these environments, some political actors have incentives to learn and gather information, while others have incentives to influence and manipulate this information. This Special Issue addresses the question of how information structures, information transmission, and communication technologies influence political environments and affect the incentives faced by political actors. This is a collection of articles, combining game-theoretical and experimental work. The articles promote novel ideas and address understudied questions, which range from salience determination to microtargeting, ambiguous voting and information naivety. The findings complement the existing literature and suggest rationales for inefficiencies that arise in political environments with incomplete and noisy information. 2021-02-11T23:20:47Z 2021-02-11T23:20:47Z 2020-04-07 23:07:09 2020 book 44797 9783039284474 9783039284467 https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/56543 eng application/octet-stream Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International https://mdpi.com/books/pdfview/book/2074 MDPI - Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute 10.3390/books978-3-03928-447-4 10.3390/books978-3-03928-447-4 46cabcaa-dd94-4bfe-87b4-55023c1b36d0 9783039284474 9783039284467 80 open access |
| spellingShingle | B1-5802 correlation neglect n/a voting experiment mutual optimism pivotality incentives to go to war jury trial ambiguity multidimensional policy space electoral competition recency bias negative campaigning strategic disclosure information committee decision making microtargeting office-motivated candidates information aggregation thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy Gratton, Gabriele Zudenkova, Galina Political Games: Strategy, Persuasion, and Learning |
| title | Political Games: Strategy, Persuasion, and Learning |
| title_full | Political Games: Strategy, Persuasion, and Learning |
| title_fullStr | Political Games: Strategy, Persuasion, and Learning |
| title_full_unstemmed | Political Games: Strategy, Persuasion, and Learning |
| title_short | Political Games: Strategy, Persuasion, and Learning |
| title_sort | political games strategy persuasion and learning |
| topic | B1-5802 correlation neglect n/a voting experiment mutual optimism pivotality incentives to go to war jury trial ambiguity multidimensional policy space electoral competition recency bias negative campaigning strategic disclosure information committee decision making microtargeting office-motivated candidates information aggregation thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy |
| topic_facet | B1-5802 correlation neglect n/a voting experiment mutual optimism pivotality incentives to go to war jury trial ambiguity multidimensional policy space electoral competition recency bias negative campaigning strategic disclosure information committee decision making microtargeting office-motivated candidates information aggregation thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy |
| url | 44797 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT grattongabriele politicalgamesstrategypersuasionandlearning AT zudenkovagalina politicalgamesstrategypersuasionandlearning |