Mediterranean-First? Anglo-American Strategic Planning and the Origins of the Allied Occupation of Italy (1939-1943)
The arrival of the Allies in Italy in July 1943 was not the result of an impromptu decision, but rather of a prolonged debate that involved both political and military agencies in London and Washington for the first four years of the Second World War. The decision to pursue the defeat of the Axis th...
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| Natura: | Online |
| Lingua: | italiano |
| Pubblicazione: |
FedOA - Federico II University Press
2021
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| Accesso online: | https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/72016 |
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| _version_ | 1869528515479601152 |
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| author | Aterrano, Marco Maria |
| author_browse | Aterrano, Marco Maria |
| author_facet | Aterrano, Marco Maria |
| author_sort | Aterrano, Marco Maria |
| collection | Directory of Open Access Books |
| description | The arrival of the Allies in Italy in July 1943 was not the result of an impromptu decision, but rather of a prolonged debate that involved both political and military agencies in London and Washington for the first four years of the Second World War. The decision to pursue the defeat of the Axis through the invasion of Sicily had been reached by the Anglo-American leaders at Casablanca, in January 1943. The choice to give precedence to Italy in the framework of the European war was by no means a foregone conclusion, and its importance in the strategic developments of World War II in Europe has often been underestimated. This research seeks to re-evaluate the role that the elimination of Italy played in the overall strategy developed by the Allies during the first phase of the Mediterranean conflict. The analysis of the political debates, military planning, and strategic appreciations produced by Anglo-American decision-makers in the 1939-1943 period shows that the Allied wartime interest in Italy, its defeat and the occupation of its territory was the result of a long-term design. |
| format | Online |
| id | doab-20.500.12854ir-72016 |
| institution | Directory of Open Access Books |
| language | ita |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publishDateRange | 2021 |
| publishDateSort | 2021 |
| publisher | FedOA - Federico II University Press |
| publisherStr | FedOA - Federico II University Press |
| record_format | ojs |
| spelling | doab-20.500.12854ir-720162022-01-31T22:22:30Z Mediterranean-First? Anglo-American Strategic Planning and the Origins of the Allied Occupation of Italy (1939-1943) Aterrano, Marco Maria World War II Mediterranean strategy Allied military planning Allied occupation of Italy Mediterranean Strategy Wartime Planning xxxx The arrival of the Allies in Italy in July 1943 was not the result of an impromptu decision, but rather of a prolonged debate that involved both political and military agencies in London and Washington for the first four years of the Second World War. The decision to pursue the defeat of the Axis through the invasion of Sicily had been reached by the Anglo-American leaders at Casablanca, in January 1943. The choice to give precedence to Italy in the framework of the European war was by no means a foregone conclusion, and its importance in the strategic developments of World War II in Europe has often been underestimated. This research seeks to re-evaluate the role that the elimination of Italy played in the overall strategy developed by the Allies during the first phase of the Mediterranean conflict. The analysis of the political debates, military planning, and strategic appreciations produced by Anglo-American decision-makers in the 1939-1943 period shows that the Allied wartime interest in Italy, its defeat and the occupation of its territory was the result of a long-term design. Published The arrival of the Allies in Italy in July 1943 was not the result of an impromptu decision, but rather of a prolonged debate that involved both political and military agencies in London and Washington for the first four years of the Second World War. The decision to pursue the defeat of the Axis through the invasion of Sicily had been reached by the Anglo-American leaders at Casablanca, in January 1943. The choice to give precedence to Italy in the framework of the European war was by no means a foregone conclusion, and its importance in the strategic developments of World War II in Europe has often been underestimated. This research seeks to re-evaluate the role that the elimination of Italy played in the overall strategy developed by the Allies during the first phase of the Mediterranean conflict. The analysis of the political debates, military planning, and strategic appreciations produced by Anglo-American decision-makers in the 1939-1943 period shows that the Allied wartime interest in Italy, its defeat and the occupation of its territory was the result of a long-term design. 2021-10-04T18:39:24Z 2021-10-04T18:39:24Z 2017 book https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/72016 ita Clio: Essays in History, Archaeology and Art History application/pdf Attribution 4.0 International http://www.fedoabooks.unina.it/index.php/fedoapress/catalog/book/39 FedOA - Federico II University Press 10.6093/978-88-6887-012-6 The arrival of the Allies in Italy in July 1943 was not the result of an impromptu decision, but rather of a prolonged debate that involved both political and military agencies in London and Washington for the first four years of the Second World War. The decision to pursue the defeat of the Axis through the invasion of Sicily had been reached by the Anglo-American leaders at Casablanca, in January 1943. The choice to give precedence to Italy in the framework of the European war was by no means a foregone conclusion, and its importance in the strategic developments of World War II in Europe has often been underestimated. This research seeks to re-evaluate the role that the elimination of Italy played in the overall strategy developed by the Allies during the first phase of the Mediterranean conflict. The analysis of the political debates, military planning, and strategic appreciations produced by Anglo-American decision-makers in the 1939-1943 period shows that the Allied wartime interest in Italy, its defeat and the occupation of its territory was the result of a long-term design. 10.6093/978-88-6887-012-6 725b3cbf-52ac-4597-b597-c9b6ee3fc903 16 285 Napoli open access |
| spellingShingle | World War II Mediterranean strategy Allied military planning Allied occupation of Italy Mediterranean Strategy Wartime Planning xxxx Aterrano, Marco Maria Mediterranean-First? Anglo-American Strategic Planning and the Origins of the Allied Occupation of Italy (1939-1943) |
| title | Mediterranean-First? Anglo-American Strategic Planning and the Origins of the Allied Occupation of Italy (1939-1943) |
| title_full | Mediterranean-First? Anglo-American Strategic Planning and the Origins of the Allied Occupation of Italy (1939-1943) |
| title_fullStr | Mediterranean-First? Anglo-American Strategic Planning and the Origins of the Allied Occupation of Italy (1939-1943) |
| title_full_unstemmed | Mediterranean-First? Anglo-American Strategic Planning and the Origins of the Allied Occupation of Italy (1939-1943) |
| title_short | Mediterranean-First? Anglo-American Strategic Planning and the Origins of the Allied Occupation of Italy (1939-1943) |
| title_sort | mediterranean first anglo american strategic planning and the origins of the allied occupation of italy 1939 1943 |
| topic | World War II Mediterranean strategy Allied military planning Allied occupation of Italy Mediterranean Strategy Wartime Planning xxxx |
| topic_facet | World War II Mediterranean strategy Allied military planning Allied occupation of Italy Mediterranean Strategy Wartime Planning xxxx |
| url | https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/72016 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT aterranomarcomaria mediterraneanfirstangloamericanstrategicplanningandtheoriginsofthealliedoccupationofitaly19391943 |