Bad Beliefs
Why do people come to reject climate science or the safety and efficacy of vaccines, in defiance of the scientific consensus? A popular view explains bad beliefs like these as resulting from a range of biases that together ensure that human beings fall short of being genuinely rational animals. This...
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| Format: | Online |
| Idioma: | anglès |
| Publicat: |
Oxford University Press
2022
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| Matèries: | |
| Accés en línia: | OCN: 1287134451 |
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| _version_ | 1869528017927143424 |
|---|---|
| author | Levy, Neil |
| author_browse | Levy, Neil |
| author_facet | Levy, Neil |
| author_sort | Levy, Neil |
| collection | Directory of Open Access Books |
| description | Why do people come to reject climate science or the safety and efficacy of vaccines, in defiance of the scientific consensus? A popular view explains bad beliefs like these as resulting from a range of biases that together ensure that human beings fall short of being genuinely rational animals. This book presents an alternative account. It argues that bad beliefs arise from genuinely rational processes. We’ve missed the rationality of bad beliefs because we’ve failed to recognize the ubiquity of the higher-order evidence that shapes beliefs, and the rationality of being guided by this evidence. The book argues that attention to higher-order evidence should lead us to rethink both how minds are best changed and the ethics of changing them: we should come to see that nudging—at least usually—changes belief (and behavior) by presenting rational agents with genuine evidence, and is therefore fully respectful of intellectual agency. We needn’t rethink Enlightenment ideals of intellectual autonomy and rationality, but we should reshape them to take account of our deeply social epistemic agency. |
| format | Online |
| id | doab-20.500.12854ir-78109 |
| institution | Directory of Open Access Books |
| language | eng |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publishDateRange | 2022 |
| publishDateSort | 2022 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| publisherStr | Oxford University Press |
| record_format | ojs |
| spelling | doab-20.500.12854ir-781092025-07-30T11:56:34Z Bad Beliefs Levy, Neil belief, evidence, rationality, autonomy, nudging thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTK Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTQ Ethics and moral philosophy thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTS Social and political philosophy thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTK Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTQ Ethics and moral philosophy thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTS Social and political philosophy Why do people come to reject climate science or the safety and efficacy of vaccines, in defiance of the scientific consensus? A popular view explains bad beliefs like these as resulting from a range of biases that together ensure that human beings fall short of being genuinely rational animals. This book presents an alternative account. It argues that bad beliefs arise from genuinely rational processes. We’ve missed the rationality of bad beliefs because we’ve failed to recognize the ubiquity of the higher-order evidence that shapes beliefs, and the rationality of being guided by this evidence. The book argues that attention to higher-order evidence should lead us to rethink both how minds are best changed and the ethics of changing them: we should come to see that nudging—at least usually—changes belief (and behavior) by presenting rational agents with genuine evidence, and is therefore fully respectful of intellectual agency. We needn’t rethink Enlightenment ideals of intellectual autonomy and rationality, but we should reshape them to take account of our deeply social epistemic agency. 2022-02-04T04:04:20Z 2022-02-04T04:04:20Z 2022-02-03T10:29:20Z 2021 book OCN: 1287134451 https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/52638 https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/78109 eng open access image/jpeg image/jpeg image/jpeg image/jpeg Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/20.500.12657/52638/1/9780192895325.pdf https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/20.500.12657/52638/1/9780192895325.pdf https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/20.500.12657/52638/1/9780192895325.pdf https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/20.500.12657/52638/1/9780192895325.pdf Oxford University Press 10.1093/oso/9780192895325.001.0001 10.1093/oso/9780192895325.001.0001 db4e319f-ca9f-449a-bcf2-37d7c6f885b1 Macquarie University Wellcome Trust Wellcome 224 Oxford WT104848/Z14/Z open access |
| spellingShingle | belief, evidence, rationality, autonomy, nudging thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTK Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTQ Ethics and moral philosophy thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTS Social and political philosophy thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTK Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTQ Ethics and moral philosophy thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTS Social and political philosophy Levy, Neil Bad Beliefs |
| title | Bad Beliefs |
| title_full | Bad Beliefs |
| title_fullStr | Bad Beliefs |
| title_full_unstemmed | Bad Beliefs |
| title_short | Bad Beliefs |
| title_sort | bad beliefs |
| topic | belief, evidence, rationality, autonomy, nudging thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTK Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTQ Ethics and moral philosophy thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTS Social and political philosophy thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTK Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTQ Ethics and moral philosophy thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTS Social and political philosophy |
| topic_facet | belief, evidence, rationality, autonomy, nudging thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTK Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTQ Ethics and moral philosophy thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTS Social and political philosophy thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTK Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTQ Ethics and moral philosophy thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTS Social and political philosophy |
| url | OCN: 1287134451 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT levyneil badbeliefs |