Global Carbon Pricing
Why the traditional “pledge and review” climate agreements have failed, and how carbon pricing, based on trust and reciprocity, could succeed. After twenty-five years of failure, climate negotiations continue to use a “pledge and review” approach: countries pledge (almost anything), subject to (unen...
সংরক্ষণ করুন:
| বিন্যাস: | Online |
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| ভাষা: | ইংরেজি |
| প্রকাশিত: |
The MIT Press
2022
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| বিষয়গুলি: | |
| অনলাইন ব্যবহার করুন: | ONIX_20220221_9780262340380_64 |
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| _version_ | 1869528187467202560 |
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| collection | Directory of Open Access Books |
| description | Why the traditional “pledge and review” climate agreements have failed, and how carbon pricing, based on trust and reciprocity, could succeed. After twenty-five years of failure, climate negotiations continue to use a “pledge and review” approach: countries pledge (almost anything), subject to (unenforced) review. This approach ignores everything we know about human cooperation. In this book, leading economists describe an alternate model for climate agreements, drawing on the work of the late Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom and others. They show that a “common commitment” scheme is more effective than an “individual commitment” scheme; the latter depends on altruism while the former involves reciprocity (“we will if you will”). The contributors propose that global carbon pricing is the best candidate for a reciprocal common commitment in climate negotiations. Each country would commit to placing charges on carbon emissions sufficient to match an agreed global price formula. The contributors show that carbon pricing would facilitate negotiations and enforcement, improve efficiency and flexibility, and make other climate policies more effective. Additionally, they analyze the failings of the 2015 Paris climate conference. Contributors Richard N. Cooper, Peter Cramton, Ottmar Edenhofer, Christian Gollier, Éloi Laurent, David JC MacKay, William Nordhaus, Axel Ockenfels, Joseph E. Stiglitz, Steven Stoft, Jean Tirole, Martin L. Weitzman |
| format | Online |
| id | doab-20.500.12854ir-78544 |
| institution | Directory of Open Access Books |
| language | eng |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publishDateRange | 2022 |
| publishDateSort | 2022 |
| publisher | The MIT Press |
| publisherStr | The MIT Press |
| record_format | ojs |
| spelling | doab-20.500.12854ir-785442024-03-30T02:52:51Z Global Carbon Pricing Cramton, Peter MacKay, David JC Ockenfels, Axel Stoft, Steven emissions clean air climate change environmental economics CO2 greenhouse gases Paris Agreement free rider problem thema EDItEUR::K Economics, Finance, Business and Management::KC Economics::KCV Economics of specific sectors::KCVG Environmental economics Why the traditional “pledge and review” climate agreements have failed, and how carbon pricing, based on trust and reciprocity, could succeed. After twenty-five years of failure, climate negotiations continue to use a “pledge and review” approach: countries pledge (almost anything), subject to (unenforced) review. This approach ignores everything we know about human cooperation. In this book, leading economists describe an alternate model for climate agreements, drawing on the work of the late Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom and others. They show that a “common commitment” scheme is more effective than an “individual commitment” scheme; the latter depends on altruism while the former involves reciprocity (“we will if you will”). The contributors propose that global carbon pricing is the best candidate for a reciprocal common commitment in climate negotiations. Each country would commit to placing charges on carbon emissions sufficient to match an agreed global price formula. The contributors show that carbon pricing would facilitate negotiations and enforcement, improve efficiency and flexibility, and make other climate policies more effective. Additionally, they analyze the failings of the 2015 Paris climate conference. Contributors Richard N. Cooper, Peter Cramton, Ottmar Edenhofer, Christian Gollier, Éloi Laurent, David JC MacKay, William Nordhaus, Axel Ockenfels, Joseph E. Stiglitz, Steven Stoft, Jean Tirole, Martin L. Weitzman 2022-02-21T15:11:15Z 2022-02-21T15:11:15Z 2017 book ONIX_20220221_9780262340380_64 9780262340380 9780262036269 https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/78544 eng The MIT Press image/jpeg n/a https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/10914.001.0001 The MIT Press The MIT Press 10.7551/mitpress/10914.001.0001 10.7551/mitpress/10914.001.0001 ae0cf962-f685-4933-93d1-916defa5123d 9780262340380 9780262036269 The MIT Press 268 Cambridge open access |
| spellingShingle | emissions clean air climate change environmental economics CO2 greenhouse gases Paris Agreement free rider problem thema EDItEUR::K Economics, Finance, Business and Management::KC Economics::KCV Economics of specific sectors::KCVG Environmental economics Global Carbon Pricing |
| title | Global Carbon Pricing |
| title_full | Global Carbon Pricing |
| title_fullStr | Global Carbon Pricing |
| title_full_unstemmed | Global Carbon Pricing |
| title_short | Global Carbon Pricing |
| title_sort | global carbon pricing |
| topic | emissions clean air climate change environmental economics CO2 greenhouse gases Paris Agreement free rider problem thema EDItEUR::K Economics, Finance, Business and Management::KC Economics::KCV Economics of specific sectors::KCVG Environmental economics |
| topic_facet | emissions clean air climate change environmental economics CO2 greenhouse gases Paris Agreement free rider problem thema EDItEUR::K Economics, Finance, Business and Management::KC Economics::KCV Economics of specific sectors::KCVG Environmental economics |
| url | ONIX_20220221_9780262340380_64 |