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Rechtsschutz der Aktionäre der Zielgesellschaft bei unterlassenem Pflichtangebot nach § 35 WpÜG

According to prevailing opinion, shareholders have no remedies in the case of failure to make a mandatory takeover offer under sec. 35 of the German Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act (WpÜG), as the WpÜG is not considered to serve the purpose of individual protection. However, the WpÜG implemen...

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Gardado en:
Autor Principal: Huchel, Maximilian
Formato: Online
Idioma:alemán
Publicado: Duncker & Humblot 2025
Subjects:
Durchsetzung des Unionsrechts
Enforcement of Union law
Euromin Holdings
Funktionale Subjektivierung
Functional subjectivization
Private Enforcement
Strukturprinzip
Structural principle
thema EDItEUR::L Law::LN Laws of specific jurisdictions and specific areas of law::LNC Company, commercial and competition law: general::LNCD Company law
thema EDItEUR::1 Place qualifiers::1D Europe::1DF Central Europe::1DFG Germany
Acceso en liña:https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/161075
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Summary:According to prevailing opinion, shareholders have no remedies in the case of failure to make a mandatory takeover offer under sec. 35 of the German Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act (WpÜG), as the WpÜG is not considered to serve the purpose of individual protection. However, the WpÜG implements the EU Takeover Directive and must be interpreted in light of ECJ case law, which aims to empower EU citizens to enforce their rights (functional subjectivisation). The conclusion of this treatise, therefore, deviates from the prevailing opinion, asserting that the subjectivisation of the mandatory takeover offer regulation is required under EU law.

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