The Political Economy of Sovereign Default

What do self-interested governments’ needs to maintain loyal groups of supporters imply for sovereign incentives to repay debt? Many sovereign defaults have occurred at relatively low levels of debt, while some highly indebted nations continue to honour their obligations. This poses a problem for tr...

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1. Verfasser: Sebastian Hohmann
Format: Online
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Graduate Institute Publications 2021
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Online-Zugang:23820
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author Sebastian Hohmann
author_browse Sebastian Hohmann
author_facet Sebastian Hohmann
author_sort Sebastian Hohmann
collection Directory of Open Access Books
description What do self-interested governments’ needs to maintain loyal groups of supporters imply for sovereign incentives to repay debt? Many sovereign defaults have occurred at relatively low levels of debt, while some highly indebted nations continue to honour their obligations. This poses a problem for traditional models of sovereign debt, which rely on the threat of economic sanctions to explain why and when a representative agent seeking to maximise social welfare would choose debt-repayment. The...
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spelling doab-20.500.12854ir-565412022-01-31T14:47:34Z The Political Economy of Sovereign Default Sebastian Hohmann risks State | Nation financial globalisation non-state actors and civil society debt finance governance What do self-interested governments’ needs to maintain loyal groups of supporters imply for sovereign incentives to repay debt? Many sovereign defaults have occurred at relatively low levels of debt, while some highly indebted nations continue to honour their obligations. This poses a problem for traditional models of sovereign debt, which rely on the threat of economic sanctions to explain why and when a representative agent seeking to maximise social welfare would choose debt-repayment. The... 2021-02-11T23:20:43Z 2021-02-11T23:20:43Z 2017-10-09 11:02:38 2012 book 23820 9782940503070 9782940503087 https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/56541 eng image/jpeg Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International http://www.7switch.com/en/ebook/9782940503087 http://www.placedeslibraires.fr/livre/9782940503087 http://books.openedition.org/iheid/509 Graduate Institute Publications 72b0526f-f1c9-41b3-a451-219e0317e896 9782940503070 9782940503087 open access
spellingShingle risks
State | Nation
financial globalisation
non-state actors and civil society
debt
finance
governance
Sebastian Hohmann
The Political Economy of Sovereign Default
title The Political Economy of Sovereign Default
title_full The Political Economy of Sovereign Default
title_fullStr The Political Economy of Sovereign Default
title_full_unstemmed The Political Economy of Sovereign Default
title_short The Political Economy of Sovereign Default
title_sort political economy of sovereign default
topic risks
State | Nation
financial globalisation
non-state actors and civil society
debt
finance
governance
topic_facet risks
State | Nation
financial globalisation
non-state actors and civil society
debt
finance
governance
url 23820
work_keys_str_mv AT sebastianhohmann thepoliticaleconomyofsovereigndefault
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