The Political Economy of Sovereign Default
What do self-interested governments’ needs to maintain loyal groups of supporters imply for sovereign incentives to repay debt? Many sovereign defaults have occurred at relatively low levels of debt, while some highly indebted nations continue to honour their obligations. This poses a problem for tr...
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| Hovedforfatter: | |
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| Format: | Online |
| Sprog: | engelsk |
| Udgivet: |
Graduate Institute Publications
2021
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| Fag: | |
| Online adgang: | 23820 |
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Lignende værker: The Political Economy of Sovereign Default
- ‘Environmental Childlessness?’
- Rural and Remote Communities as Non-State Actors
- EIB Working Paper 2026/04 - Sovereign debt dynamics at the brink of default and the special role of supranational lenders
- Putting the Ontological Back into Ontological Security
- Too Complex or Too Ambitious?
- Sovereign Wealth Funds